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R. C. PANDEYA

The Mādhyamika Philosophy: A New Approach *

IF THE CONTROVERSY between the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of Buddhism regarding the nature of reality is taken into consideration, the position of the Mādhyamika school will be more easily understood. The Vaibhāṣika theory of the reality of all the elements of past and future was criticized by the Sautrāntikas on the ground that what we really know is only in the present.[1] This view was made possible by the development of the original theory of impermanence into that of momentariness. The momentariness of an object, in its turn, depends upon a peculiar criterion of reality called efficiency (*arthakriyā-kāritva*). The efficiency of an object ensures it reality, but in that respect it must change. So, a real object was conceived as constantly changing. Taking their hint from the Sāṁkhya, the Buddhists believed in natural, mechanical change; unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, they rejected the notion of an efficient cause in the form of a supernatural, metaphysical reality called God. But, as it would have been against common notion to believe in the total change of the face of an object, they believed in the change of the components of an object. Thus they were led to believe in the double character of a thing. Strictly speaking, a thing is constantly changing in its component elements or atoms; in other words, by its nature it is evanescent, but apparently it remains unchanged for a considerable period of time. Thus a thing-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*), a thing in its specific form, is momentary; but a thing-in-general (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), a thing in its generic form, appears to be permanent.[2] Granting this distinction between appearance and reality, and accepting reality as efficient and thus momentary, it can be concluded consistently that reality is given only in the present, not in the past or the future.

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*Read before the XXVI International Congress of Orientalists, in New Delhi January, 1964.

[1]Candrakīrti, *Madhyamaka-vṛtti* (hereafter *MV*), on Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamaka-kārikā* (hereafter *MK*), Louis de La Vallée-Poussin, ed. (St. Petersbourgh: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1903–1913), p. 444.

[2]Cp. Dharmakīrti, *Nyāya-bindu* (hereafter *NB*), I.

Efficacious reality, self-changing as it is, follows a law of its own. A harmony between momentary reality and apparent permanence was to be explained; otherwise, a composite thing, being nothing over and above its component elements, would become entirely unrecognizable due to its novelty every moment. The identity of a composite thing was therefore supposed to be rooted in an unbroken series of similar though discrete particular momentary realities (*kṣaṇa-saṁtāna*). Thus the original Buddhist law of Dependent Origination was resorted to in order to keep the stream of momentary particulars going on uninterruptedly. The preceding moment was not supposed to be the cause of the succeeding one in the Sāṁkhya sense of the real, natural transformation of a cause into an effect (*satkārya-vāda=pariṇāma*); had that been the case, the change would have been nugatory. It was also not like the efficient cause (*kṛtimat*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which out of the material cause creates something entirely new (*asat-kārya-vāda=ārambha-vāda*)—for in that case similarity between cause and effect would not be explained. The Naiyāyikas themselves admit the effect to be nothing but the consequent of its prior absence.[3] In the theory of their contemporary idealist colleagues, the Vijñānavādins (Yogācāras), they saw a danger of eternalism (*śāśvata-vāda*)—for, according to the latter, the realities of the universe are simply appearances in the storehouse consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*). The old formula explanation of causality, viz., "This being, that arises" (*asmin sati idaṁ bhavati*), cannot explain simultaneously existing elements—for in that formula each particular element is supposed to follow a preceding particular. Thus causality was conceived by the Sautrāntikas as "appearance of such realities as are by their very nature evanescent, in co-ordination with other realities."[4] Here appearance does not mean total absence of reality as in the case of idealistic systems of philosophy. It means that the very momentary existence of a naturally evanescent entity enables it to be efficacious and thus real. Strange though it may seem, for them reality consists in appearance; in the absence of its appearance a thing is unreal (*uccheda*). This appearance is not of something (*satkārya*), nor is it out of nothing (*asatkārya*); it is because of the force (*saṁskāra*) of co-ordinating realities. Thus realities make other realities appear; they do not create one, nor do they produce one. In this lies their efficacy.

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[3] Annam Bhaṭṭa, *Tarka-saṁgraha* (hereafter *TS*), 39.

[4] *MV*, p. 5, quotes the view of some other philosophers about *pratītya-samutpāda* ". . . *prati prati ityānām vināśinām samutpada iti varṇayanti.*" La Vallée-Poussin and Th. Stcherbatsky identify this with the view of the Sautrāntikas. See *MV*, p. 5, note 10, and Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (Leningrad: Publishing Office of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1927), p. 86, note 1. Cp. *Abhidharma-koṣa-bhāṣya of Vasabandhu* (in press), III. 28.

Such a reality forms the basic core of perception, but cannot be directly apprehended because of its momentary character. Therefore, it can be inferred only from its impact on the mind of the perceiver (efficacy). But its existence cannot be denied because in that case a veridical perception could not be distinguished from illusory perception.[4a] Veridical perception itself results when various factors, including the object, which is nothing but an appearing momentary reality, co-ordinate. But, as the perception of an evanescent reality is not possible, it is contended that the object of perception is a composite thing which is comparatively permanent and hence not real in itself. What we perceive is therefore not the real-in-itself but the real-in-general (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). This is really the incapacity of our mind, which is not able to penetrate beneath the hard shell of generality. But this generality itself should not be taken as something entirely non-existent because, after all, it derives its existence from evanescent reality. But it is not located in the real particular; it is a creation of our own mind (*kalpanā*), through which the real object (*idaṁ*) is perceived. When we perceive a jar, e.g., there is a concept of jar (*paratantra*=depending upon the other i.e., other than the real object, viz., mind) which itself refers to the real external object, the object existing independent of any mind perceiving it (*svatantra*). In a judgment like "This is a flower," "this" stands for the real momentary object, but is not known as such; "flower" stands for the concept but depends upon "this" for its reference. All knowledge is therefore ultimately the knowledge of "this," the real momentary element (*idaṁ-pratyayatā*), but apparently it has a tinge of concepts (*savikalpa*). The "this" part of it is real (*idaṁ-satya*); the conceptual part is make-believe. We have to sift the husk from the grain in order to be emancipated from the powerful impact of concepts.

Thus this theory rules out the possibility of knowing the real but accepts its existence on the strength of its impact on our mind. From our experience, now of a flower, now of a man, a horse, etc., etc., we are compelled to believe in its particularity, but its generic character is relegated to the position of nescience because what we know is necessarily manifold, and efficacy lies in a particular, not in the universal. Thus reality is manifold, free from concepts (*nirvikalpa*), in itself a directly unknowable something (*idaṁ-mātra*). Monism is condemned as a wrong view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*=*kalpanā*).

The Mādhyamikas had to defend their own view against Brāhmaṇical systems, the Sāṁkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the one hand, and against

[4a] See note 2, above.

the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, on the other. They came with a new interpretation of the teachings of the Master which they thought was not properly presented by any Buddhist school of philosophy. In their zeal to preserve the sanctity of the concept of Middle Path (*madhyamā pratipad*) of the Buddha, they came forward with a novel interpretation of the theory of causality popularly called the theory of Dependent Origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). Their interpretation completely changed the picture of the Buddha's teachings and presented a landmark in the history of Indian philosophy.

While criticizing the Brāhmaṇical view of soul as something over and above the five elements (*skandhas*) composing it, Candrakīrti, the illustrious commentator on Nāgārjuna, says that, although the Brāhmaṇas tell us about something which is supposed to be beyond these composing elements, the description of this entity, called soul, does not depend upon the direct knowledge of the soul. The soul is not directly known, and the Brāhmaṇas admit its unknowability. This criticism means that what the soul is in-itself is never found, but the Brāhmaṇas take pleasure in describing it as existent, blissful, etc. This description of soul cannot refer to soul-in-itself; the Brāhmaṇas would never agree that the description really stands for the conglomeration of five elements, as they are afraid that in that case the cherished soul will be reduced to evanescent reality. Hence, in reality, their soul is nothing but a name (*nāma-mātraka*).[5] Thus, in the opinion of the Mādhyamikas, such a view of soul is even worse than the Sautrāntika view, which presents the description of soul as directly referring to its generic character (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), thereby meaning that there is an evanescent reality (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) at the root. Therefore, for the Brāhmaṇas, the soul would be a purely imaginary entity having no existence. Thus, the Mādhyamikas think that there can be a description in the Russellian sense which need not involve the actuality of referent.[6] A description without any reference is a fabrication of words

[5] *MV*, pp. 344–345.

[6] A true proposition contains a particular as a constituent. A proposition like "I saw a unicorn," though significant, is false, because unicorn is not a constituent. "I shall say an object is 'known by description' when we know that it is 'the so-and-so,' i.e., when we know that there is one object, and no more, having a certain property: and it will generally be implied that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance," says Russell in *Mysticism and Logic* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1925), p. 214.

He elucidates this point further by saying, "Suppose we say: 'The round square does not exist.' It seems plain that this is a true proposition, yet we cannot regard it as denying the existence of a certain object called 'the round square' . . . . Thus in all such cases, the proposition must be capable of being so analysed that what was the grammatical subject shall have disappeared." Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, Introduction (2nd ed., Cambridge: The University Press, 1925), chap. III, p. 66. See also Russell's *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), chap. XVI; B. Russell, "On Denoting," *Mind*, Vol. XIV, No. 56 (October, 1905), 479–483; B. Russell, *The Problems of Philos-*

(*prapañca*).[7] It is like the expression "a barren woman's daughter" (*vandhyā-duhitṛ*). Such a description of a girl would not attract even highly passionate people.[8]

A second type of description refers to the generic character of an object (*sāmānya=vikalpa=*imagined) as belonging to a reality-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa=idaṁ-pratyaya=*this). Here a distinction may be made between the case where this generic character actually refers to the reality-in-itself and the case where it merely appears to refer to it. The former may be called the case where description is accompanied by demonstration (*vikalpa*), and the latter is mere description without any real demonstration (*vikalpa-mātra*). In both cases reference is involved; whether it is actual or only supposed makes all the difference. Veridical perception differs from illusory perception only on this ground. In Mādhyamika terminology, in the former case the "truth of 'this'" is taken in correlation with the description (*idaṁ-satyābhiniveśa*), whereas in the latter case there is only the "awareness of 'this'" (*idaṁ-pratyaya-mātra*) without an actual correlation.[9] Apart from this metaphysical analysis, the two cases are alike from the point of view of the knowledge-situation (*pratīti=pratyaya*). In knowledge we cannot tell veridical perception from illusory perception. This is the case with the knowledge of ordinary human beings (*pṛthag-jana*). An object is known in co-ordination with the generic concept and evanescent efficacious reality (*upādāya-prajñapyamāna*), and such knowledge is couched in language (*vikalpa+prapañca*).[10]

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ophy (London, New York; Oxford University Press, 1959), chap. V. For philosophical implications of this theory see B. Blanshard, *Reason and Analysis*, Paul Carus Foundation Lectures, 12th Series (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 323 ff.

[7]Cp. *śabda-jñānānupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ*. Patañjali, *Yoga-sūtra* (hereafter *YS*), I. 9.

[8]*MV*, p. 360.

[9]Candrakīrti seems to make a distinction between *idaṁ-pratyaya* and *idaṁ-pratyaya-mātra*. Some Buddhist opponents of the Mādhyamika system (Sautrāntika?) correlate *idampratyayatā* with "ultimate truth" — *paramarṣigaditam idaṁ-pratyayatā-pratītya-samutpāda-lakṣaṇaṁ paramārtha-satyam* (*MV*, p. 159). But Candrakīrti thinks of all the so-called cases of causation as *idaṁ-pratyayatā-mātra* whereby he means something utterly unreal (*MV*, p. 189). A common man thinks what is *idaṁ-pratyayā-mātra* to be something ultimately real (*MV*, p. 172). This distinction between *idaṁ-pratyayatā* and *idaṁ-pratyayatā-mātra* corresponds to that of Russell between "Constituent of a proposition" and "incomplete symbol." See L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (New York: Crowell, 1930), pp. 152–158. For the Mādhyamikas, every symbol, including demonstratives, is an incomplete symbol, and we know "by description only."

[10]The word "*prajñapti*" is explained in *Abhidharmakoṣa-vyākhyā* (hereafter *Abhidh, k.v.*) (236d) as follows: "*prajñaptiṁ anupatita iti yathā saṁjñā saṁjñā yathā vyavahāras tathā 'nugata ity arthaḥ.*" (See *MV*, p. 137, note 3.) A statement attributed to the Master is quoted by Candrakīrti thus: *bālo bhikṣavo śrutavān pṛthagjanaḥ prajñaptim anupatitaḥ cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭvā saumanasya-sthāniyānya-bhiniviśate* (*MV*, p. 137). In *MK*, XXIV. 18, Nāgārjuna equates *prajñapti* with the Middle Path. There, "*upādāya prajñapti*" means "a description without any constituent," which does not necessarily entail actual causation. (See *MV*, p. 504.) But the realists, who interpret causation as an actual production from co-ordinating factors, would interpret it as a description rooted in acquaintance, i.e., as having a real constituent. *Prapañca* for the Mādhyamikas is a verbal description—*prapañco hi vāk prapañcayatyarthān iti kṛtvā* (*MV*, p. 373); the Sautrāntikas would like to interpret *prapañca* as directly coming

Thus far the realists, like the Sautrāntikas, would prefer to be with the Mādhyamikas. But the Mādhyamikas leave their predecessors behind at this point.

We have seen that for both the Mādhyamikas and the Sautrāntikas knowledge refers to something external. In the phenomenological sense all knowledge is intentional.[11] This is true of illusory cognition also. But for the Sautrāntikas the external is something in co-ordination with which (*pratītya*=*pratyaya*) knowledge arises, and this is a necessary presupposition by which they distinguish veridical perception from illusory cognition. There is not only intentionality, there is also a real sense-datum. But the Mādhyamikas cast a doubt upon the reality of "this," i.e., the co-ordinating character (*pratyaya*) of the intended reality. The "this" is said to be the object of knowledge because it is efficacious in the appearance of veridical perception. Hence, in spite of the fact that it is not known in itself, its existence cannot be denied. The Mādhyamikas do not subscribe to this view of knowledge. They say that an efficacious reality is not a necessary condition or co-ordinating factor for perception, because perception takes place even when there is admittedly no such reality present, e.g., the perception of a double moon. Perception simply entails a concept referring to something external. This something external need not be actual. Thus, from this point of view we have veridical perception on a par with illusory perception. So far as knowledge is concerned, in both the cases there is an awareness of "this" (*idaṁ-pratyaya*), but we cannot at the same time hold the truth of actual existence of "this" (*idaṁ-satya*). That is the reason why Candrakīrti condemns the view of "truth of this" as childish.[12]

But, then, how distinguish between a veridical perception and an illusory one? For the Mādhyamikas, this question does not arise. The Sautrāntikas think that knowledge depends upon things other than the knowledge itself; they co-ordinate to make it appear. The so-called real is known as "the other" (*anya*). This otherness is either superfluous, if it is supposed to refer to something which is already different from knowledge, or impossible, if it actually does not refer to the other. The supposed reality at the root of

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from the concepts (*nāma-jāti-kalpanā*), yet rooted in realities (*svalakṣaṇa*). See *Abhidh., k.v., nimittodgrahaṇātmiketi (saṃjñā). Nimittaṁ vastuno 'vasthāviśeso nīlatvādi tasyodgrahaṇaṁ paricchedaḥ* (*MV*, p. 63, note 3.) Candrakīrti says, "*vikalpaḥ cittapracāraḥ*" (*MV*, p. 374), whereby he means to say that the Sautrāntika conception of *vikalpa*, viz., as associated with *svalakṣaṇa*, is not accepted in the Mādhyamika system.

[11] *Vijñapti* (intention) is of two kinds, according to the Sautrāntikas. *Viprayuktā vijñapti* (*MV*, p. 444), i.e., intention without any object, is empty, whereas *aviprayuktā vijñapti*, or simply *vijñapti*, is an intention with some object—*tad hi parasmād ādīyate* (*MV*, p. 309, note 3).

[12] *MV*, p. 173.

veridical perception cannot be proved; hence, knowledge operating only with concepts will have to be explained in terms of concepts.[13] The supposed reality in itself does not contribute to our knowledge. The concept of it alone will explain knowledge. Thus, illusory cognition is as much conceptual as non-illusory cognition. In the absence of any effective tool at our disposal to institute a distinction, we have to take them as of one kind.[14]

Inasmuch as we cannot go beyond the concepts and penetrate into the nature of reality in itself, it would be absurd to assert the existence of reality merely on the strength of our knowledge. That is a mere supposition. But, it may be urged, if reality does not contribute to knowledge, how is it that when an object is placed before us we perceive it; when it is removed we cease to perceive it? Had knowledge been purely conceptual, perception or non-perception would have depended on the will of the perceiver. To explain this phenomenon the famous twelve-linked formula of Dependent Origination is pressed into service, with a different interpretation, of course. We need not say that reality actively co-ordinates, because activity itself is a concept. We can assert only that the concepts *inter se* are relative to each other. Co-ordination is replaced by relativity (*sāpekṣatā*).

The metaphysicians are wont to jump from concepts to actual things of which these concepts are supposed to be replicas. If there is a concept of the other, then they think that there must be an actual other. Similarly, if two things are conceived as co-ordinating, a metaphysician would think, without the least hesitation, that there are two such actual things. The Mādhyamikas chide such metaphysicians by saying that co-ordination of things is not at all possible and relativity itself leaves an actual reality, if there be any, untouched. Co-ordinating factors must be different from the supposed thing to result from their co-ordination. Co-ordination presupposes difference, on the one hand, among co-ordinating factors, and, on the other hand, between co-ordinating factors and their result. But the fact is that these factors themselves, being momentary, cannot co-ordinate, and, even if their co-ordina-

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 254–255.

[14] Mind functions and creates concepts—that is what is perhaps meant by Candrakīrti when he says "*vikalpaś cittapracāraḥ*" (*MV*, p. 374). It is interesting to note that Candrakīrti criticizes Diṅnāga's definition of perception, viz., *kalpanāpoḍham*, by saying, "*kalpanāpoḍhasyaiva ca jñānasya pratyakṣatvā 'bhyupagamāt, tena ca lokasya śaṁvyavahārābhāvāt, laukikasya ca pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahārasya vyākhyātum iṣṭatvāt, vyarthaiva pratyakṣa-pramāṇa-kalpanā samjāyate* (*MV*, p. 74). It is implied in this criticism that perception, and for that matter any *pramāṇa*, depends upon *kalpanā* or concept which=*vikalpa*. Therefore, he says that perception is determined with reference to intentional knowledge (*ataḥ pratyakṣaṁ vyavasthāpyate tadviṣayeṇa jñānena saha*) (*MV*, p. 75). I prefer to read "*tadviṣayiṇā*" instead of "*tadvisayeṇa*" as it is found in the Tibetan version, i.e., *de.i.yul.can.gi*. This being the case, it follows that illusory perception of double moon, etc., is also as good a perception as any veridical perception (*dvicandrādīnām tvataimirika-jñānāpekṣayā apratyakṣatvam, taimirikādyapekṣayā tu pratyakṣatvam eva*) (*MV*, p. 75).

tion is accepted, they cannot be said to be in a relation of causation to something which is yet to be produced. Relationship can be assumed to exist only between two things existing simultaneously.[15] In knowledge we assume that there is an object (*ālambana*) which is responsible for it. But can we show the relationship between an object and its knowledge? The Mādhyamikas give a negative answer to this, saying that what we are aware of is only a concept of an object; this concept is based upon another concept of relation. The concept of relation, in its turn, depends upon two things that are related. In order to prove actual relation between two things we refer to the concept of relation and say that had there been no relation the concept of relation would never have arisen. But the Mādhyamikas would pay the realists back in their own coin, because, for them, if there had been no concept of relation, actual relation itself would never have been assumed. Therefore, we can say with justification that the concepts are responsible for the notion of actually existing things, but we cannot say the converse because except concepts we have no other means to ascertain the actual state of affairs.[16] Thus, the notion of causality for the Mādhyamikas is not rooted in actual co-ordination of factors. It means only dependence of one concept upon another (*hetu-pratyayāpekṣa*).[17]

This dependence is not to be conceived in a metaphysical sense. It is purely an epistemic relativity. Having proved the impossibility of actual relationships among things, the Mādhyamikas propose to show that it is a concept that makes other concepts appear. An example of this type of dependence, very often repeated in their texts, is that of big and small (*dīrgha* and *hrasva*[18]). It is clear that in itself a thing is neither big nor small; it is only when we come to compare two things that in relation to one the other is big or small as the case may be. Thus the concept of bigness arises because there is a concept of smallness and vice versa. Similarly, the entire furniture of our knowledge is nothing but a great fabrication of mutually dependent concepts.

But, in that case, we have to explain the origin of primary concepts. For the realists there is no difficulty: these concepts would arise in co-ordination with actual realities. But the Mādhyamikas, who intend to oust metaphysics from the realm of philosophy, cannot agree to this. They would say

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[15]For a detailed discussion of causality, see *MV*, pp. 78–85; 250–258.

[16]*anālambana evāyaṁ san dharma upadiśyate (athā'nālambane dharme kuta ālambanam punaḥ)* (*MK*, I. 8).

[17]*hetu-pratyayāpekṣo bhāvānām utpādaḥ pratītya-samutpādārthaḥ* (MV, p. 5).

[18]*yasmād yatpratītya yad bhavati tasmāt tad anyan na bhavati sāpekṣatvād bījāṅkuravat hrasva-dīrghavacceti* (MV, p. 252).

that so-called basic concepts are in no way better than other concepts. Candrakīrti makes a distinction between general relativity (*anaṅgī-kṛta-artha-viśeṣa*) and specific relativity (*aṅgī-kṛta-artha-viśeṣa*).[19] Relativity as a basic tendency of mind may be compared to a field which is given to the mind to play in. Within this relativity-field our mind encounters other things, but, conditioned as it is by the relativity-field, it takes those specific objects in the light of relativity. To say that this relativity is associated with mind without any beginning is to assert indirectly that it cannot go beyond its field. Mind is confined to the field of relativity; only concepts and not things can be legitimately relative; hence, mind cannot know the thing-in-itself. The Sautrāntikas think that, although the realities cannot be directly known, they are many, momentary, and efficacious. This view is rejected since to say that reality is many involves the concept that relation, momentariness, and efficacy are not possible without the concept of causation. The very logic which rejects oneness of reality (viz., in knowledge only the manifold is given, and thus monism is fictitious) compels us to disown plurality also, since not the manifold real but only the concept of relation is given to play with. Thus reality-in-itself is neither one nor many.

Relativity-field is interpreted as the general law of causality, which is expressed in the formula "this being, that arises," which means that given a concept it will lead to another concept. The causal formula of the Master—*pratītya-samutpāda*—therefore shows that reality is not born, nor does it die. It is neither momentary nor efficacious. Nāgārjuna discusses this relativity-field in the first chapter of his famous book and various particular concepts, such as motion, conjunction, time, space, emancipation, and soul that arise as a result of this relativity, in subsequent chapters.[20] He invariably comes to the conclusion that all these are mere concepts rooted in their mutual dependence, and hence they cannot describe the real-in-itself. The task of philosophy is to show that reality conceived within the relativity-field is conceptual, and hence it has no essence of its own, i.e., it is not what it would be in itself (*svabhāva-śūnya*).

The question as to what is the cause of the relativistic tendency of the mind itself cannot be answered because that involves a state beyond the relativity-field, and our mind cannot venture in that realm. An unanswerable question is no question. Similarly, the question whether this relativity-field

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[19] *prāptyarthas tvanangīkṛtārtha-viśeṣe' pi pratītya-śabde saṁbhavati prāpya sambhavaḥ pratītya-samutpāda iti, angīkṛtārtha-viśeṣe 'pi saṁbhavati, cakṣuḥ pratītya cakṣuḥ prāpya cakṣuḥ prekṣyeti vyākhyānāt* (MV, pp. 6–7).

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

is relative also cannot be finally answered because any answer to this would presuppose relativity. Thus, the most consistent position of a philosopher should be to take his experience as a play of interdependent concepts which, having no connection with reality, are empty. Within the field of relativity emptiness means devoid of content (*nairātmya*), and not of existence (*abhāva*). The concepts prevail powerfully upon and obscure the vision of the mind, and hence they are there but are not to be confused with reality (*saṁvṛti-satya*).

But the concepts are pregnant with intentionality. Actually a concept refers to another concept (*pratītya=saṁvṛti-satya*), but, if a concept is taken as referring to reality (as realists in general do), it is delusion. That is called a wrong notion (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*). Notion (*dṛṣṭi*) and truth (*satya*) should be carefully distinguished. To think that the existence of a concept means the existence of a thing is a notion which is utterly false; to think that a concept exists because there are other concepts is a truth.[21] The former has its repercussions in the form of bondage; the latter has no repercussions in the sense that bondage, being a relative concept, has a contentless existence.

It is possible to have a wrong notion about truth. If it is propounded that the concepts are empty existences, it may be taken by some deluded person to mean that these concepts exist. For such persons relativity means existence (*bhāva*). This is a confusion worse confounded. These people first deny what is truth (*saṁvṛti-satya*) and then proceed to accept what is not so. One who says that there are realities first denies that there are relative concepts (a truth) and then forms a notion that these concepts must be real in themselves because they exist. He takes relativity as an indication of the existence of concepts. Nāgārjuna thinks that those people who reduce the relative truth of concepts to a mere notion are incurable (*tān-asādhyan-babhaṣire*). Hence, relativity should not be made a notion, just as eternalism is a notion.[22]

Truth as relativity is accepted by common people, who have no philosophical axe of their own to grind. One concept leads to another concept. Causality presupposes the concept of a cause and an effect, motion depends upon a mover, space depends upon the concept of something occupying it, time assumes changing objects, soul depends upon the concept of various mental activities, and even liberation depends upon the concept of prior bondage and subsequent release of a person. We are not justified to go beyond these concepts and assume reality, just as we are asked to avoid the mis-

[21] *MK*, XXVII. 26. This is to be contrasted with *MV*, p. 591.
[22] *MK*, XIII. 8; *MV*, p. 247.

conception about the real existence of concepts. What we know are mere concepts, and they are not realities in the sense in which we talk of such realities. It would be absurd to maintain the existence of realities, but it would be more so to maintain their non-existence. We are conceptually undecided about there being realities, and thus the Mādhyamikas are exonerated from the charge of agnosticism.[23] Thus, any statement should always be construed in the sense that the meaning of it refers either to concepts or to words or to both together, but never to a state of material reality. In modern philosophical terminology, we should have either conceptual mode or formal mode of speech, but not the material mode of speech. The formal mode of speech differs from the conceptual mode insofar as the first one depends purely upon the habit of speech and does not arouse any concept in its hearer. For example, "A flower in the sky is fragrant" does not give any sense because it is rooted only in the language-habit of a person, i.e., on the model of a significant sentence any other sentence can be framed. This is what is called a "language fabrication" (*prapañca*) by the Mādhyamikas.[24] Significant sentences, on the other hand, give us an idea of the state of affairs. These statements are significant on two counts: first, they are framed strictly in accordance with rules of a particular language—in this respect they are analogous to the previous example (*prapañca*); and, second, they are capable of arousing some concept in the minds of hearers and thus can continue the chain of concepts. They are therefore not only the fabrications of language but also of mind (*citta-pracāra-kalpanā*).[24a] Unlike the Grammarians, the Mādhyamikas do not believe in the inseparability of concepts from language.

But the realm of reality is a prohibited area; concepts unable to reach at the realities simply create an illusion of reality in the mind of a person. We have shown in detail that this external reference is due to the intentionality of concepts. If concepts cannot give us a glimpse of realities, how can we expect the language to describe it? Reality therefore eludes both our concepts and language. It is without the pale of the fabrications of language and concepts (*niṣprapañca* and *nirvikalpa*).[25]

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[23] *na ca vayam abhāvārtham śūnyatārtham vyācakṣumahe kin tarhi pratītya-samutpādārtham* (MV, p. 499).

[24] *te ca vikalpā anādimat-saṁsārābhyastāj jñāna-jñeya-vācya-vācaka-kartṛ-karma-kāraṇa-kriyā-ghaṭapaṭa-mukuṭa-ratha-rūpa-vedanā-strī-puruṣa-lābhā 'lābha-sukha-duḥkha-yaśo-yaśo-nindā-praśaṁsādi-lakṣa-ṇād vicitrāt prapañcād upajāyante* (MV, p. 350); also (MV, p. 373).

[24a] See note 10 above.

[25] *apara-pratyayam śāntam prapañcair aprapañcitam (nirvikalpam anartham etat tattvasya lakṣa-ṇam)* (MK, XVIII.9).

Here "*tattva*" is to be clearly distinguished from "*satya*."

Some interpreters of this system have committed the same mistake which is emphatically being avoided by this school.[26] They think that, although the Mādhyamikas deny speech and thought to reality, they still maintain from a "higher standpoint" an existent real in the form of the Cosmic Body of the Buddha (*dharma-kāya*), which is described as "without a second" (*advaya*). In actuality this all seems to be a mere fabrication of mind.

Let us examine here the concept of a "higher standpoint" (*paramārtha*). Nāgārjuna talks of this standpoint, and his commentator explains it at great length.[27] The entire empirical life is governed by the concepts of description, the described, knowledge, the known, etc. These are, rightly speaking, without any foundation in reality. But they themselves, being relative, present a phase of truth. We cannot penetrate the sheath of concepts because, since it is itself smoky in nature, it only causes our fall to fathomless depth. They are relative among themselves but never because of something relational. This is the right view about concepts (*samyak-dṛṣṭi*). Similarly, there is nothing higher than these concepts, because, again, the concepts themselves, being relative, cannot lead to the pinnacle of absolute truth. Even if that higher truth be there, it would be relative, since it would be achieved through relative concepts.[28] Therefore, it is difficult to agree with that interpretation which ascribes to the Mādhyamikas an Absolute.

But Nāgārjuna says that truth is twofold: the truth about relatives and the truth in itself.[28a] It is absurd to say, as many have, that the phrase "*loka-saṁvṛti-satya*" (empirical truth) means relative truth. Truth, rightly speaking, can never be relative. Truth about relatives is not the same thing as relative truth. That concepts are relative is a truth about relatives but it itself is absolute. Had this not been the case, it would have been impossible to distinguish between the Jaina theory of relative truth (*anekānta-vāda*) and this concept of the Mādhyamikas. Thus, when truth is conceived in itself without reference to relative concepts, it is the absolute truth. We have seen that all concepts are governed by the law of relativity. Wherever that law

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[26]Cp. "In full accordance with the idea of a monistic universe it is now asserted that there is not a shade of difference between the Absolute and the phenomenal, between *Nirvāṇa* and *saṁsāra*. The universe viewed as a whole is the Absolute, viewed as a process it is the phenomenal." Th. Stcherbatsky, *BN*, p. 48. Again, see "There is no reason to single out the Mādhyamika as specially nihilistic. If anything, his is a very consistent form of absolutism." T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (2nd ed., London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 234.

[27]*MK*, XXIV. 8, and *MV* on it.

[28]MV, p. 493. It is wrong to translate "*Nirvāṇa*" by "Absolute" because "*nirvāṇam api māyopamaṁ svapnopamaṁ vadāmi kiṁ punar anyad dharmam. Yadi nirvāṇād apyanyaḥ kaścid dharmo viśiṣṭataraḥ syāt tam apy ahaṁ māyopamaṁ svapnopamam iti vadeyam.*" This statement of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (Calcutta, 1932), p. 40, clearly states *Nirvāṇa* also to be a mere concept.

[28a]See note 27 above.

is applicable, we find relativity. But, what about this relativity itself? It is well known even to a casual reader of the *Mādhyamika Kārikās* that for this school the law of relativity itself is everything, and Nāgārjuna salutes the Master because he proclaimed this as truth.[29] Hence, to think that the Mādhyamikas believe in some *Brahman*-like Absolute seems to read too much between the lines.[30]

If we are to consider a few remarks about such truth in itself found in the works of this school, our misconception would be reduced to a minimum. It is said that those who do not know the distinction between truth in itself and truth about relatives do not know the reality underlying the Buddha's teachings (*tattva*).[31] Here the author uses the word "truth" (*satya*) to mean an instrument for the realization of reality (*tattva*). Reality, on the other hand, is said to be self-realizable, quiescent, not fabricated by the fabrications of speech and mind (*prapañcair-aprapañcittam* and *nirvikalpa*), and without distinction (*anānārtha*).[32] So long as we operate with concepts we are not dealing with reality. But, when concepts cease to appear relatively, speech and mind stop fabricating. As a result, all the inflictions arising out of attachment to these concepts cease to bother a person. This state is not achieved by means of others' preachings. Candrakīrti beautifully illustrates this point by an example. A man with defective eyes perceives queer things like hair floating in the air, etc. If a man with normal eyesight tells him about the unreality of these apparent objects to him, he will refuse to believe him. He may think of these objects as unreal but not as non-existent. But when his eyes are cured he ceases to perceive their existence. Similarly, a person, although convinced about the unreality of concepts, continues to be led away by their intentionality. He has to stop even the flow of relative concepts to get at the real. This he has to do by himself. What he gets when this whirlwind of relative concepts is over is the real, but he will then be incompetent to

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[29] *MK*, I. 1–2.

[30] Our cognition of empirical objects is true when those objects are viewed in the light of relative concepts. It is a truth that every concept is relative; this I call the *loka-samvṛti-satya* of the Mādhyamika. But it is utterly false that the concepts are absolute, unrelated entities; for that matter, our notion of an absolute objective reality is relegated to the position of falsity; it is not even *samvṛti*. In contrast to this is a truth about this truth itself. It is true not only that the *concepts* are relative but also that *relativity*, too, thrives upon these concepts. This second truth about relativity itself is the *paramārtha-satya* of the Mādhyamikas. See *MK*, XII. 8 and *MV* on the same. When relativity of concepts is fully realized, the relativity itself ceases to operate because there is nothing to be operated upon. This state would be the ideal state, or *Nirvāṇa*. Hence, *paramārtha* is cessation of concepts where relativity consumes itself. This is the truth, the real nature of things, *tathatā*, the Supreme Doctrine of the Middle Path proclaimed by the master, the Perfect Wisdom—*prajñā-pāramitā*—and the mother of all the enlightened ones.

[31] *MK*, XXIV. 9.

[32] *Ibid.*, XVIII. 9.

speak about it to the world at large. Truth about the relativity of concepts is to be told to the world (*loka-saṁvṛti-satya*) because the concepts are still there, but the truth in itself can never be told since concepts do not contribute to it.[33] But, as it is entirely against the accepted canon of logic to maintain a truth and yet refuse to say it, it has been found convenient to state it negatively. Truth is negation of concepts.[34]

But reality should not be confused with truth. Only a proposition can be true or false. Thus truth-value belongs to a statement, not to a fact. Negation or affirmation is only a mode in which propositions are stated; hence, only a proposition can be negative or positive. There is no negative truth as such, because such a thing is not distinct from falsity. A proposition is positive or negative; it is either true or false. Truth in itself is always positive. Reality is distinct from propositions, because it can neither be affirmed nor denied; it is neither true nor false. It is not the same thing as truth, because it is the view that we take of it. Hence, when we find a distinction instituted between two truths, the lower and the higher, it means only a less correct and a more correct view of reality. And, of course, the view is not the same thing as the real.

That the concepts are relative is a truth, but a less correct one, which assumes relativity as the standard. A and B are conceived as relatives because of the standard of relativity. But to ask whether relativity is relative is an absurd question because there cannot be another relativity for this relativity to be made relative. It is an absolute standard of reference in the case of all things, concepts included, other than itself. But it is equally obvious that, in the absence of anything relative, relativity itself loses its significance. Either believe in relativity or in the Absolute. One cannot believe in both together. In the Advaita Vedānta the effort is made to reconcile the difference between the empirically real and the absolutely real by introducing the principle of cosmic illusion (*māyā*), but whether that illusion itself is illusory or not can never be adequately explained—since, if it is not illusory, then it does in no way differ from the Absolute, but, if it is illusory, we require another illusion to make it illusory. In the Mādhyamika system such an anomalous position does not arise because, unlike Advaita Vedānta, it is an out-and-out anti-metaphysical system. Relativity applied to concepts is an effective tool, but when devoid of concepts it devours itself.[34a] Thus relativity conceived in itself would be the end of relativity. Thus, it is said to be the consummation

[33] *MV*, 373.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 374.
[34a] See note 30 above.

of the cessation of all notions, concepts, and ideas. The word "*śūnyatā*" used by this school is very significant in this connection. It does not mean a vacuous reality but only vacuity of thought.[35] But to say that such is the case is a truth—in fact, the truth that the most perfect wisdom can conceive of (*prajñā-pāramitā*).

But the question still remains unanswered: Can there be a truth without reality? If there is nothing which this truth-statement purports to assert, it is false. Thus, it may be urged, and in fact has been urged, that since there is a truth asserted therefore there must be a reality.[36] But such an interpretation of the Mādhyamikas goes entirely against the spirit of the school. Had the Mādhyamikas ever maintained that at the empirical level concepts and realities are inextricably mixed up, as the Advaitins assert (*satya-anṛte mithunī-kṛtya*),[37] then it would have been proper to say that, once they have denied reality to concepts, whatever remains undeniable (*pratyak*) is real for them. But the case is just the opposite. Since for them relative concepts are, though existents, devoid of the touch of reality, when their existence disappears nothing remains as their substratum to shine in its own light. For the Advaitins, negation is used with the ultimate aim of implicit affirmation. "Not-A" implies something other than A. But, for the Mādhyamikas, negation is used simply to affirm the negation itself: "Not-A" means simply the absence of A. If the absence of a table is a fact and "table is absent" is a truth, it is equally justified to maintain with the Mādhyamikas that "the concepts are non-existent" is a truth because of the fact that the concepts are not to be found. This is not only a matter of emphasis on the negative approach (*niṣedha-mukha*); this is the very essence of the philosophical vision of the Mādhyamikas.[38] But, if contrary to all usage, we want to call a negative fact reality or the Absolute, we are free to do so. Words, says Candrakīrti, like a policeman with a chain and a baton in hand, do not compel us to use them in one way and not the other.[39] Thus relativity of concepts is a truth about the relative concepts, but cessation of all concepts is a truth about relativity itself. Just as no reality is involved in the relativity of concepts, no reality or Absolute is involved in the cessation of concepts.

This denial of concepts does not amount to denial of reality, nor does it

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[35]*MK*, XVIII. 7.

[36]"Absolutism is committed to the doctrine of two truths; for, it makes the distinction between the thing as it is, unrelatedly, absolutely, and how it appears in relation to the percipients who look at it through views and standpoints." Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

[37]*Śaṁkara-bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra*, I. 1, Introduction.

[38]Nāgārjuna, *Vigrahavyāvarttani*, 64 (hereafter *VV*).

[39]*MV*, p. 24.

imply an affirmation of some Absolute. If there were any ultimate reality it could not be touched by our affirmations or denials. *Nirvāṇa*, the final goal of a Buddhist, is to be viewed in this light. The soul, being merely a conceptual idea, is denied, and hence nothing conceivable can attain this state; nor can this state be described, because, having been discovered after the cessation of all concepts, it remains beyond concepts. The truth about *Nirvāṇa* can be couched in negative language. Even questions like whether *Nirvāṇa* is the same as the real can best be answered by comparing two negative concepts and not by identifying them. Nāgārjuna says that the nature of reality is like *Nirvāṇa* (*Nirvāṇaṁ iva-dharmatā*).[40] Reality is like *Nirvāṇa* only in the sense that each of them is conceived by negating all concepts (*niṣedhena-sāmyam*) fabricated by our mind and language. It is like saying that X_1 is not a, b, c . . . n, X_2 is also not a, b, c . . . n, therefore X_1 and X_2 are similar. But to say that they are identical presupposes some common positive factor the presence of which warrants identity of the two. On the negative side, the world and *Nirvāṇa* are identical because the world in itself is unaffected by transitory and relative concepts and so is *Nirvāṇa*,[41] but on the positive side nothing can be stated because *Nirvāṇa* and reality are not known to share certain common characteristics.[42]

The state of *Nirvāṇa* is not an achievement; it is a revelation. The famous controversy over the relative worth of action and knowledge in the Advaita Vedānta and the final decision that knowledge is not an action but simple revelation are perhaps a logical corollary of identification of liberation and the world, and accords well with the ideal of *bodhisattva* and a *jīvanmukta*. A result to be achieved is contingent upon the act done to achieve it and thus is relative. *Nirvāṇa*, on the other hand, is simply the cessation of all relatives and therefore cannot be said to depend upon the act. When the relatives cease to exist, it is *revealed* and this is not made or unmade, known or unknown.[43]

The Mādhyamika system prefers to use the word "*advaya*" but the Advaita Vedānta has a fascination for the word "*advaita*." These words are very significant insofar as they bring out the essential differences in these two systems. The word "*advaita*" means free from duality (*avidyamānaṁ dvaitaṁ*

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[40] *nivṛttam abhidhātavyaṁ nivṛtte cittagocare* (*anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharmatā*) (*MK*, XVIII. 7).

[41] *MK*, XXX. 19–20, and *MV*, p. 536. Also see *MK*, XXV. 22–23 and *MV* on it.

[42] *kathaṁ tarhi saṁsāra iti ced ucyate-ātmātmīyāsadgrāha-grastānām bāla-pṛthag-janānām asat-svarūpā api bhāvāḥ satyataḥ pratibhāsante* (*MV*, p. 523). This alone can be said to be the positive aspect of the world. For the positive aspect of *Nirvāṇa*, see *MK*, XXV. 4–6.

[43] *tadā tat tattvam anadhi-gamana-yogena svayam adhigacchanti* (*MV*, p. 373).

yasmin) and thus describes indirectly (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*) the *Brahman*, to which duality cannot be ascribed. "*Advaya*" does not mean the denial of duality but of *two*, because the Mādhyamikas do not make a distinction between a concept and the real object of which it is a concept, but for a Vedāntin there is such a distinction. Thus by denying two objects they even deny one because the concept "one" is dependent upon the concept "two."[44] If we are permitted to see in the Mādhyamikas a philosophy of numbers, we can say that they take delight in the concept of zero.[45] It is against the background of zero that the concept one can arise. To say that a number is not one means it is two or more, but to say that it is not two may mean either that it is one or more than two. In order to avoid this ambiguity they introduce the term "*śūnya*," or zero. A number which is not two (*advaya*) and zero (*śūnya*) is obviously zero without any reference to a positive number. The Vedāntins describe the real as one only (*ekam eva*), which means without a second (*advitīyam*). Numerically speaking, they do not recognize zero as something significant. Zero itself stands between the absence of numbers and positive numbers from one up to infinity. Thus the word "*advaya*" read with the word "*śūnya*" means complete absence of numberable objects or the number concept. But what this *śūnya* is in itself cannot be answered. Any attempt to answer this question will land us in relativity. One thing is certain,

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[44] *astitva-nāstitva-dvaya-vāda-nirāsena tu vayam nirvāṇa-pura-gāminam advaya-patham vidyotayāmahe* (*MV*, p. 329).

[45] How number has been treated as a motif for the explanation of cosmic process is evidenced by early Greek philosophy. Parmenides, following Xenophanes, declared Being as one, complete and definitive. The Pythagoreans thought that the permanent Being was to be found in numbers. Plato designated his Idea of the Good as the One and attempted to derive from it the duality of infinite and measure (see A. Trendelenburg, *Platonis de Ideis et Numeris Doctrina—ex Aristotele Illustrata* [Lipsiae, 1826]). Plotinus thinks that of the "First," which is exalted above all finite determinations and oppositions, nothing can be predicated in the strict sense. "It is only in an improper sense, in its relation to the world, that it can be designated as the infinite One, as the Good, as the highest Power or Force."—Dr. W. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, J. H. Tufts, trans. (2nd ed. rev. and enl. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 245. In the philosophy of the Renaissance, numbers played a very important part. "The book of nature is written in numbers; the harmony of things is that of the number-system" (*ibid.*, p. 372). Coming down to modern philosophy, the same problem of reality was viewed in terms of monism, dualism, and pluralism. Descartes' mind and matter, Spinoza's one Substance, Leibniz' plurality of monads, and, finally, Hegel's one Absolute show the way in which numbers play a part in the determination of philosophical concepts. Modern logicians like Frege and Russell give a new orientation to number-concept (see B. Russell, *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*). In India, the controversy about the number of ultimate reality dates back to the *Ṛg-veda*. Reality is one but described as many (*ekaṃ sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*—I.164.46), the episode of the twin birds (I.164.20), and the Nāsadīya Sūkta (*RV*, X.129), which perhaps thinks in terms of void or zero, give a glimpse of the numerical thinking of the ancient seers. The Upaniṣads abound in discussions about the one and the many. Has the name "Sāṁkhya" anything to do with numbers? Except the two Mīmāṁsās, all other systems of orthodox Indian philosophy proceed with the enumeration of various categories, viz., 24 or 25 categories of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, six categories of the Vaiśeṣika, 16 categories of the Nyāya. The Uttara Mīmāṁsā school discusses the relation between the one (*Brahman*) and the many (*jīva-jagat*). That early Buddhism was fond of categorization and counting is evidenced in the Abhidhamma philosophy. The term "*śūnya*," preferred by the Mādhyamikas to designate their concept of reality, therefore assumes importance.

that it is not nothing. Had that been the case, the relative concepts would never have arisen.[46]

The Mādhyamika system is called dialectical Absolutism by its modern interpreters. Dialectic understood in the Hegelian sense is a synthetic thought-process, but the Mādhyamika would be the last person to subscribe to any synthetic approach. They are out-and-out analysts; they profess the analysis of concepts. Adept as they are in bringing out an element of contradiction in every concept, they do not move upward to some synthetic unity, either in the Kantian or in the Hegelian sense. They operate upon the concepts and leave the wound gaping without making any attempt at bandaging or balming it. They simply show that the concepts are self-contradictory but never attempt to remove the contradiction. Contradiction is the very core of the truth about relative concepts. If this contradiction is somehow removed, even relative concepts cease to be, and that would be a state of utter nothingness, which is to be avoided. Let there be no illusion about the existence of uncontradictory concepts, because that would be a mere nothing. The Mādhyamikas show contradiction because they feel that in this way they would accord some reality to concepts. Is it not a fact that what is dependently originated alone is real (*pratītya-samutpanna*)? This purpose cannot be achieved by synthesis. But is it possible to call an analytic system dialectical? The Mādhyamikas have no thesis of their own to prove. But every dialectician has to prove a thesis—the summation of thought-process, e.g., the Idea (Platonic), the Absolute (Hegelian or Bradleyan).[47] Śaṁkara gets the credit

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[46]Number zero is often used to indicate absence of quantity. "We can define all the natural numbers if we know what we mean by '0' and 'successor' " (Russell, *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 20). Thus, number 1 can be defined as the successor of 0. But 0 itself is not the successor of any number. All the natural numbers, therefore, proceed from 0 (*ibid.*, pp. 24, 25). A number is defined as a number of terms in a class; number 0 is the number of terms in a class which has no member. Since a class is not identical with its member, "0 is the class whose only member is the null-class" (*ibid.*, p. 23). In this light "*śūnya*" will mean a class having no member; and "*ekam*" will mean a class having one member. "*Ekam*" can be explained in terms of "*śūnyam*," and thus would be inferior to the latter. "*Śūnyam advayam*" is a higher philosophy than that of "*ekam advaitam.*" But we are emphatically asked not to take *śūnya* as a notion or concept (*dṛṣṭi*), because that, being a class (*jāti* = *sāmānya* = *kalpanā*), is in no way better than other class-concepts.

[47]Zeno is said to be the father of dialectical method, who thereby sought to defend the Parmenidean Being against change and plurality. The object of the Sophists being transformation of rhetoric from a traditional art to a science, they made themselves the mouthpiece of all the unbridled tendencies which undermined social, ethical, and spiritual ideals of life. Dialectic was, in this case, a dangerous weapon, placed in a wrong hand. Socrates, utilizing the sophistry of the Sophists and employing dialectical method skillfully, found the essence of knowledge. For Plato, Ideas and their relations to one another are to be found by means of subordination and co-ordination of concepts, which he called dialectic. Aristotle's dialectic searches out the starting points for deduction and the highest principles of explanation. Identity, difference, and union of that which has been distinguished are the three momenta of the dialectical process, according to Proclus. For Abelard, dialectic has no longer the task which Anselm, following Augustine, prescribed, viz., making the content of faith comprehensible for the intellect; he pressed this into the service of critically deciding doubtful cases.

for evolving a new technique of dialectic insofar as his Absolute is not achieved by means of upward thought-movement, the thesis for him, being indubitable, is not to be proved(*ātman* is said to be *pratyak*). Hence, according to him, the only function left for the dialectic is to show a correlation between the accomplished (*siddha-Brahman*) and what is found in itself a baseless appearance. A complete identity between "that" (*tat*) and "thou" (*tvam*) is instituted by the dialectic. "*Tvam*" is not brought up to the level of "*tat*," nor is "*tat*" forced down to the level of "*tvam*." They are on the same plane; only, "*tvam*" is shown not to exist as "*tvam*." His dialectic therefore works for the elimination of relation, internal as well as external. For Hegel and his fellow dialecticians, relation is the very core of the Absolute, as it is for Rāmānuja. For Śaṁkara, this same relation is the root of appearance. For the former, if relation is removed a thing is reduced to naught; for the latter, removal of relation means uncovering the veil of reality. Śaṁkara's *Brahman* would be a nugatory concept for Hegel, and Hegel's Absolute would be a mass of appearances for a Śaṁkarite. Thus, dialectic functions for Śaṁkara only on the plane of appearance, clearing undergrowths and overgrowths, and it ultimately results in the purification of thought. So what is achieved is negative; *Brahman* does not depend upon any process of thought.[48]

Nāgārjuna's analysis seems to be the original on which Śaṁkara has

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Kant, in his Transcendental Dialectic, employs this method to find out the unconditioned ideas for the totality of all phenomena of the inner sense (soul), of all data of the outer sense (the world), and of all the conditioned in general (God). Dialectical method, for Hegel, helps "to determine the essential nature of particular phenomena by the significance which they have as members or links in the self-unfolding of spirit" (Windleband, *op. cit.*, p. 611). This review of employment of the dialectical method unmistakenly shows that (1) dialectic is a synthetic process and (2) aims at proving a thesis. But the Mādhyamikas think that the synthesis of concepts would result in another concept, which they seek to avoid. In the absence of any synthetic aim, the purpose of dialectic would be merely negative. Hence, Nāgārjuna says, "*yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva me bhaved doṣaḥ nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivā' sti me doṣaḥ* (VV, p. 29). The distinction between dialectical and analytical methods is rooted in synthesis and analysis, respectively. The Mādhyamikas analyze a concept to determine whether it contains some real element, and ultimately come to conclude that it has none. Thus, instead of going upward to some synthetic unity or the Infinite, they come down to the root, the *śūnya*. In Kantian terminology, no synthetic judgment a priori is ever possible—for the Mādhyamikas.

[48]The Vedāntic conception of dialectic is well explained in the *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*, as follows:

sa vai na devāsura-martya-tiryaṅ
na strī na ṣaṇdho na pumān na jantuḥ
nā' yaṁ guṇaḥ karma na san na cā' san
niṣedha-śeṣo jayatād aśeṣaḥ. (VIII, iv. 214.)

Dialectic simply helps in eliminating misconceptions; whatever remains thus uneliminated would be the One, i.e., without a second. Thus Śaṁkara's *Brahman* is not achieved by means of a dialectical process; it is simply re-discovered. Hence, dialectic has a value only at the empirical level; transcendentally, it is also a science rooted in ignorance or *avidyā—tasmād avidyā-vad-viṣayāṇi eva pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ca* (SB, I.i.1, Introduction). At another place (SB, II.i.11), Śaṁkara paraphrases Bhartrhari, the Grammarian (cp. *Vākyapadiya*, I.34), to the same effect.

modelled his dialectic. When the former shows every concept to be self-contradictory and leaves it there, the latter seeks to synthesize self-contradictory concepts with the Absolute. In Śaṁkara we find an unwarranted jump, and it is invariably the trait of all metaphysical systems, from concepts to reality. In this respect the Yogācāras are more cautious and faithful to their basic standpoint in as far as they deny an external world. Analysis of concepts and their self-contradictory character do not warrant the self-contradictory character of objects as well. The objective reality stands unaffected by the contradiction in concepts. The Mādhyamikas think that concepts are contradictory and say nothing about realities. The Yogācāras, taking their clue from the contradiction of concepts exhibited by the Mādhyamikas, believe in the non-existence of objects. They argue that, if the concepts are contradictory and unreal, how can there be real objects corresponding to these concepts? Thus, the consciousness which is aware of this contradiction alone is real. There is a real, not that it is warranted by contradictory concepts, but because it is presupposed by contradiction itself.

Śaṁkara's position is different from these two systems. He agreed with Yogācāra idealism so far as the presupposition of contradictions, i.e., consciousness (*ātman*), is concerned. But he found it difficult to agree with them on the unreality of the objective world. He thought that if concepts are contradictory their contradiction must be judged from the standard of something non-contradictory. How can we brand a concept contradictory unless we have a scale which itself is free from contradiction. This scale should not be another concept because it would be *ex hypothesi* contradictory. Hence, it must be a unique real. With reference to this real, concepts are contradictory, but the real behind them is asserted at every step. On the objective side, too, there is a real which is correlated to the subjective counterpart, the *ātman*. The *Brahman* is a subject-object correlation. Hence, Śaṁkara's philosophy is a synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, realism and conceptualism.[49] The Mādhyamikas refuse to venture into the realm of metaphysics. They think that contradiction does not presuppose a consciousness, because such a consciousness (*vijñāna* or *ātman*) would not be separated from the concept of it. Similarly, the standard of contradiction should not be sought somewhere outside the pale of concepts, because we cannot go beyond concepts. Hence, contradiction should be taken as a fact about concepts and should not be explained in terms of something non-contradictory. When every concept, without exception, is shown to be contradictory, the very concept of contradiction

[49] *SB*, II.ii.28.

itself is contradicted. Thus, ultimately there is no contradiction, because there is nothing to be contradicted (*avivādaṁ-nibodhata*).[50] There is no Absolute, because negation of contradiction does not mean some affirmative principle. There is no nihilism, because concepts have never been associated with reality, and thus, if they cease to be, reality will continue to exist in its own right.[51] But such a reality, being conceptually zero, will not be one or many. It is neither Absolute nor a jumble of discrete particulars.[52] Therefore, just as the Mādhyamika system is not called pluralism, similarly it should not be designated as Absolutism. Metaphysical epithets like Absolutism, realism, idealism, empiricism, etc., should not be used for this, because it is not a metaphysical system. It would also be wrong to say that the school has any logical view of its own in the form of dialectic—since it has nothing to establish or nothing to achieve. Accepting for argument's sake the logic of the opponent, all that this school does is demonstrate by that very logic that his results are not free from contradiction. Is it, then, justified to say that the Mādhyamikas have any form of dialectic of their own? Thus, it is neither Absolutist nor dialectical. It should therefore be called, if a name is necessary, an analytical philosophy, where analysis is confined only to concepts and language. It is not factual analysis. Again, here analysis should not be understood in the sense of exhibiting the components of a whole; rather,

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[50] *Ārya-ratna-kūṭa-sūtra*, quoted in *MV*, p. 338, reads: *tena hyāyuṣmantaḥ saṅgāsyāmo na vivadiṣyāmaḥ avivādapavamo hi śramaṇadharmaḥ*. The *Samādhirāja* also says, *vivāda-prāptyā na duhkhaṁ praśāmyate. avivāda-prāptya ca dukham nirudhyate* (*MV*, p. 136). Gauḍapāda, too, maintains the undisputability of this position (see his *Kārikā*, V. 2). This *avivāda* is due to the fact that there is absolutely nothing contradicted even from the so-called higher standpoint (*VV*, p. 30).

[51] *yasmād astitvañ ca nāstitvañ cobhayam etat pratiṣiddham tasmān na yuktam bhāvābhāvadarśanam tattvam ityāśthātum* (*MV*, p. 270).

[52] "Zero-conceptuality" should be contrasted with "unitary-conceptuality" of the Advaita Vedānta. In the Advaita, the *ātman* is accepted on the strength of indubitable experience, and everything other than *ātman* is shown to be mere appearance, because every such object conceived by us displays doubt. Thus, we start from the one, *ātman*, proceed to examine the many, and in this process invariably find only the one and never the many. Thus, the one also becomes the Infinite (*ananta*). The Real is the One and therefore the Infinite. We may take any point in this Infinite; it will always point to the Infinite as its substratum. The individual is resolved in the Universal, the Infinite, and the One. Concepts always point to the unitary concept of *ātman*. In contrast to this, the Mādhyamikas think that any point in the infinite series is a determination with reference to its preceding point, which in its turn depends upon its own preceding point, and so on until at last the indubitable ground is achieved. Contrary to the Vedāntins, this indubitable ground is not the One, because the One itself depends upon its predecessor, the zero. Instead of going forward to the Infinite, the Mādhyamikas prefer to come backward to the root. If there is a one, there is the possibility of the Infinite because one is the threshhold of infinity. If there is only a zero the possibility of infinite altogether vanishes. If any link in the twelve-linked circle of causation (*pratītya-samutpāda*) is broken the entire circle ceases to be operative, because the root of it, the zero, is discovered. This origination is rooted in zero, proceeds from it, ends in it, and itself is nothing but an extension of zero. This zero is not infinite, nor is it finite, whereas the Absolute is always infinite and never finite.

this analysis shows that the so-called whole (concept) is pregnant with contradictions, and this is not a whole at all. It is an analytic system but with a negative function. There is no one word to express this idea, and, therefore, it should either be called "analytic zeroism" (zero is not the same thing as void) or, better, be given no name at all.

WING-TSIT CHAN

Chinese Philosophy in Mainland China, 1949-1963

The Philosophical Pattern

Chinese philosophy, like everything else in mainland China, has been going through a radical transformation. In the first six years of the new regime, when the major effort was devoted to political stability and land reform, very little happened on the philosophical front. On the basis of a preliminary survey, only 17 books and about 25 magazine articles were published on traditional Chinese philosophy.[1] By 1955, however, things began to stir. In that year articles appeared in newspapers and academic journals all over China attacking Hu Shih[b] (1891–1962). No less than 175 selected articles written by 182 people were published in eight volumes during the year.[2] Very significantly the leading article in the first volume was by Kuo Mo-jo,[c] the highest ranking official in Chinese education and culture, followed by one by Li Ta,[d] long known as a top-notch communist philosopher, who was then the chairman of China's philosophical society, and the leading articles in the second and third volumes are by Li Ta himself. Prominent philosophers like Fung Yu-lan,[e] Ho Lin,[f] Kao Heng,[g] and Hou Wai-lu[h] all participated. Ai Ssu-ch'i,[i] another leading communist philosopher of long standing and vice-chairman of the philosophical society, not only

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[1] Two books on general history, four on the pre-Ch'in[ax] period, one each on Confucius, Chuang Tzu,[ay] and Mo Tzu,[az] and one on the Han[ba] period. None is controversial. About half of the articles appeared in the *Kuang-ming jih pao*[bb] (the Kuang-ming daily, hereafter cited as *KMJP*).

[2] *Hu Shih ssu-hsiang p'i-p'an*[bc] (Criticisms of Hu Shih's Thought), 8 vols. (Peking: San-lien Bookstore, 1957). Pp. 248, 372, 354, 338, 337, 316, 426, and 268.

contributed to a symposium but wrote a separate pamphlet primarily "for the young comrades" to attack Hu Shih's "reactionary philosophical thoughts."[3] Hu Shih was attacked for his idealism, for undermining materialism in the history of Chinese philosophy, for ignoring the struggle between idealism and materialism in Chinese philosophy and therefore the class struggle, and for promoting the interest of the capitalist class.

The importance of the onslaught on Hu is not only political but also because in the attack the pattern for future Chinese philosophy was set. It means that there has been much materialism in the history of Chinese philosophy, that the history of philosophy is essentially a story of the struggle between materialism and idealism, that idealism must be destroyed, and that philosophy must serve the working class.[4]

Chinese philosophy was now no longer in slumber. Philosophers began to talk and write. In the five-year period between 1955 and 1959, 132 books and about 300 periodical articles on Chinese philosophy appeared. The impetus was undoubtedly strengthened by the freedom of expression following the "Let Hundred Schools Contend" movement in May, 1956. By the end of 1963, there had been a total of 213 books and about 800 articles, involving several hundred writers, some 40 newspapers and journals, and several research institutes and philosophy departments.[5]

The Nature of the History of Chinese Philosophy

The increasing number of books and articles necessarily brought with it a greater diversity of opinion. In 1957 it was felt that the pattern of Chinese philosophy had to be more clearly delineated and more vigorously affirmed. A forum on the history of Chinese philosophy was held in January at the University of Peking[j] which lasted five days and was attended by more than

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[3]Ai Ssu-ch'i, *P'i-p'an Hu Shih ti fan-tung che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang*[bd] (A Criticism of Hu Shih's Reactionary Philosophical Thought) (Peking: Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien, 1955). Pp. 25.

[4]These themes run through the eight volumes. In addition, see especially Yang Jung-kuo, "Hu Shih's Reactionary Viewpoint and His Twisting of Ancient Chinese Philosophy," *Chung-shan*[be] *University Journal*, No. 1 (March, 1955), and Hou Wai-lu, "Criticizing Hu Shih's Suppression and Slandering of the History of Chinese Philosophy," *Che-hsüeh yen-chiu*[bf] (Philosophical Research, hereafter cited as *CHYC*), No. 2 (June, 1955). All Chinese titles of periodical articles are translated into English in this essay. Following the movement to criticize Hu Shih, one was inaugurated to criticize Liang Sou-ming[bg] for his intuitionism, nihilism, and subjective idealism, resulting in two volumes of essays. They are: *Liang Sou-ming ssu-hsiang p'i-p'an*[bh] (Criticisms of Liang Sou-ming's Thought), 2 vols. (Peking: San-lien Bookstore, 1955). Pp. 173 and 237. Ai Ssu-ch'i also wrote a pamphlet attacking Liang. This is: Ai Ssu-ch'i, *P'i-p'an Liang Sou-ming ti che-hsüeh ssu-hsiang*[bi] (Criticizing Liang Sou-ming's Philosophical Thought) (Peking: Jen-min, 1956). Pp. 67.

[5]These are but estimates. The writer is aware of 213 books and 756 articles on Chinese philosophy, not including those on philosophy in general, religion, and other allied subjects. Since export of publications was prohibited for some time and some publications were not available outside of Mainland China anyway, there must be more books and many more articles. Of the 865 articles, Fung Yu-lan accounts for 46, plus three in collaboration with others.

100 scholars, including Fung Yu-lan, Ho Lin, Ai Ssu-ch'i (who was also Vice-President of the High Party School), and Hu Sheng,[k] an editor of *Hung ch'i*[l] (Red Flag). Papers presented at the meetings and some published before or afterward were published in a volume of 400,000 words.[6]

The conference discussed many problems concerning the history of Chinese philosophy, such as its objective, its scope, and methods of study. But the main questions were two, namely, the nature of the history of Chinese philosophy and how China's philosophical heritage should be continued. Conflicting opinions were frankly and freely expressed, often in a forthright but courteous manner. No resolution was adopted, but a major opinion emerged in clear outline. According to it, the history of philosophy is nothing but the history of the struggle between materialism and idealism. The history of Chinese philosophy is no exception to this general rule, for the conflict between the theories of the original goodness and the original evil character of human nature, the opposition between the Principle of Nature and human desires, the contradiction between being and non-being, the conflict between names and actuality, etc., run through the history of Chinese thought.[7] It was stated even that the history of Chinese philosophy is but the development of Marxism-Leninism in Chinese history.[8] In other words, there is nothing unique in the history of Chinese philosophy.[9] Materialism must be promoted in the interest of class struggle.[10] It is that part of China's philosophical heritage that is materialistic and possesses a class nature and the nature of a political party that should be continued.[11] And this must be done under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's[m] writings.[12]

But there was no really final conclusion. It was repeatedly pointed out that in the history of Chinese philosophy the conflict between materialism and idealism had not been sharp and should not be exaggerated. Philosophers of two opposing schools were often friends, and many possessed both idealistic and materialistic elements. Moreover, in the words of Fung Yu-lan, materialism and idealism often "penetrated each other," "mutually modified and transformed each other," and can be united.[13] Many examples from the history of Chinese philosophy were cited to support these contentions.

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[6]Editorial Board of *CHYC*, *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih wen-ts'i t'ao-lun chuan-chi*[bj] (Symposium on Problems of the History of Chinese Philosophy) (Peking: K'o-hsüeh, 1957). Pp. 526.

[7]*Ibid.*, pp. 11–15, 24, 34, 48–49, 82–84, 127, 132, 171, 215, 325, 428, etc.

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 171.

[9]*Ibid.*, p. 130.

[10]*Ibid.*, pp. 3, 9, 24, 84.

[11]*Ibid.*, pp. 11–14, 114ff, 373, 403.

[12]*Ibid.*, pp. 436–438.

[13]*Ibid.*, pp. 18, 22.

There was a surprisingly favorable opinion from many speakers on idealism, declaring that it has its own core, that it is good and rational, and that it should be studied, even if only as an aid to understanding materialism.[14] As to the unique character of the history of Chinese philosophy, it can be revealed by the persistent attention paid to political problems and practical philosophy.[15]

Philosophical Heritage

The most hotly debated problem, however, was how to continue the philosophical heritage. Two-fifths of the essays in the volume are devoted to this question, with Fung Yu-lan as the center of the controversy. At the forum he had proposed that "to understand totally certain philosophical premises in the history of Chinese philosophy, we must pay attention to their two meanings, one abstract and the other concrete." As an example he gave Wang Yang-ming's[n] (1472–1529) doctrine of innate knowledge of the good. In advocating that man had the native ability to know good, he merely meant that feudal morality must not be imposed from the outside but must be evolved from man's innate knowledge itself, thus providing feudal morality with a new foundation. This is the concrete meaning. But the doctrine implies that all people can be sages, and this is the abstract meaning.[16] It is this abstract meaning, he said, that should be perpetuated. A barrage of criticism fell on him, for, in the eyes of his critics, his thesis is based on a transcendental philosophy above the class struggle. Under pressure he changed "abstract" to "universal,"[17] and there he strictly adhered to his argument, by no means entirely without supporters.

His thesis continued to be debated through 1958 and has remained a key issue in contemporary Chinese philosophy. In a later statement he conceded that to be meaningful the general must be coupled with the particular, but he would not give up the general.[18] This was taken to mean an attempt to compromise materialism with idealism, to perpetuate idealism and formalism in disguise, and to ignore the concrete and the particular.[19] In September,

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[14]*Ibid.*, pp. 22, 28, 216–218.

[15]*Ibid.*, pp. 33, 99, 428, 434.

[16]*Ibid.*, pp. 273–277.

[17]*Ibid.*, pp. 284.

[18]Fung Yu-lan, *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih lun-wen ch'u-chi*[bk] (Collected Essays on the History of Chinese Philosophy, 1st Series) (Shanghai[bl]; Jen-min, 1958). Pp. 130.

[19]See Wu Ch'uan-ch'i,[bm] "Mr. Fung's Philosophical Viewpoint Seen From his 'Method of Inheriting Abstract Meanings'" *CHYC* (1958), No. 2; Kuan Feng, "Criticizing Mr. Fung's Theory of Inheriting Abstract Meanings" *CHYC*, No. 3 (September, 1958); Ch'i Liang-chi,[bn] "Concerning the Problem of Continuing the Philosophical Heritage," *Hsin chien-she*[bo] (New Construction), No. 9 (September, 1958); and Lu Chün-chung,[bp] "Exposing Fung Yu-lan's False Science in His Method of Inheriting Abstract Meanings," *CHYC*, No. 5 (August, 1958).

1958, Fung finally criticized his own theory, saying that he had erroneously separated the general and the particular, resorted to idealistic technique of debate, and stood for the interest of the capitalist.[20] But the confession was viewed as merely a way to preserve his own position.[21] In this his critic was probably right, for before long he was to raise the issue again in another form, and he thereby brought on a controversy in 1962–1963 which was no less bitter than the one in 1957–1958.

Promotion of Materialism

In spite of the lack of any final conclusion in early 1957, the atmosphere was clear enough to put the major theses into practical application. Throughout the year a major effort was made to promote materialism in publications in the history of Chinese philosophy. Naturalists were interpreted as materialists, materialism in certain philosophers was magnified, and minor materialists were given a prominence that was entirely out of proportion to their thought, works, or influence in Chinese history. Two books on China's materialistic tradition were published.[22] One volume of reference material for the study of Chinese philosophy and three volumes of a five-volume set on the general history of Chinese thought by Hou Wai-lu *et al* came out in the same year.[23] All these were designed to show the richness of materialism in Chinese history and to make minor materialistic philosophers like Wang Ch'ung[o] (b. A.D. 27), Lü K'un[p] (1536–1618), Huang Wan[q] (1610–1695), and Fang I-chih[r] (1611–1671) as prominent as possible. Chang Tsai[s] (1020–1077), who replaced universal principle (*li*[t]) with material force (*ch'i*)[u] as the ultimate reality, Wang Fu-chih[v] (1619–1692), who equated concrete things with *Tao*,[w] and Tai Chen[x] (1723–1777), who revolted against the twelfth-century Neo-Confucian doctrine of the Principle of Nature (*t'ien-li*)[y] which suppressed human desires, were all hailed as great materialists. New editions of their works were brought out and an exaggerated

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[20]Fung Yu-lan, "Criticizing My Own 'Method of Inheriting Abstract Meanings,'" *CHYC*, No. 5 (August, 1958).

[21]T'ang I-chieh,[bq] "Criticizing Mr. Fung's 'Criticizing My Own Method of Inheriting Abstract Meanings,'" *Hsin chien-she*, No. 10 (October, 1958).

[22]Chang Tai-nien,[br] *Chung-kuo wei-wu chu-i ssu-hsiang chien-shih*[bs] (A Simple History of Chinese Materialistic Thought) (Peking: Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien, 1957). Pp. 131. Yang Hsing-shun,[bt] *Kuan-yü Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih chung Chung-kuo wei-wu ch'uan-t'ung*[bu] (On the Tradition of Chinese Materialism in the History of Chinese Philosophy) (Peking: K'o-hsüeh Ch'u-pan-she, 1957). Pp. 40.

[23]Department of Philosophy, Chinese People's University, ed., *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao*[bv] (Reference Material for the History of Chinese Philosophy), first series. (Peking: Chung-kuo Jen-min Ta-hsüeh Ch'u-pan-she, 1957). Pp. 296. Hou Wai-lu *et al.*, *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang t'ung-shih*[bw] (General History of Chinese Thought), Vol. I. (Peking: Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1957). Pp. 663. Vol. II. (Peking: Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1957). Pp. 456. Vol. III. (Peking: Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1957). Pp. 465.

importance was accorded them. While Wang Fu-chih may be described as a materialist, the fact that Chang Tsai equated material force with Vacuity is glossed over. In 1958, Hou Wai-lu and others wrote a short history of Chinese philosophy, which has been undoubtedly taken as the standard guide.[24] Later, several series of reading materials presented the history of Chinese philosophy in the same light: that it is the struggle between materialism and idealism and that there is a wealth of materialism in Chinese thought.[25]

Re-evaluation of Lao Tzu

In both the philosophical forum and the publications, there is the definite recognition that there is a philosophical heritage in China that is worth preserving but that it should be continued selectively. Obviously before any selection can be made there must be re-evaluation. Much of this had already been done in the forum discussions and in the printed word. By 1959, the time was ripe for a formal, open, and collective reappraisal. Naturally it should begin with Confucius and Lao Tzu.

Strangely enough, Lao Tzu,[z] rather than Confucius, was the first one to be appraised, in spite of the fact that one of the first things most new dynasties in Chinese history did was to deal with Confucianism. But it is really not so surprising, for, granting that the basic struggle is one between materialism and idealism, it is important to find out if traditional Chinese philosophy is materialistic or idealistic, and Lao Tzu's *Tao* requires clarification, whereas Confucius had little to say about metaphysical matters. In a meeting in May, 1959, at Peking University, there was an extensive discussion on Lao Tzu which centered on two problems, namely, whether he was a materialist or an idealist and whether the book, the *Lao Tzu* (*Tao-te ching*[aa]), was a product of the sixth century B.C. or the fourth or the third. In the months that followed, many articles appeared in newspapers and journals, particularly on the first question. Sixteen of these have been published as a symposium.[26] Opinions on the date of the *Lao Tzu* were about equally divided. This is also true of opinions on Lao Tzu's metaphysics. Some interpreted the

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[24]Hou Wai-lu *et al.*, *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih-lüeh*[bx] (A Simple History of Chinese Philosophy) (Peking: Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Ch'u-pan-she, 1958). Pp. 110.

[25]*Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih tzu-liao hsüan-chi*[by] (Selected Materials on the History of Chinese Philosophy). 6 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua Bookstore, 1963). *Chung-kuo li-tai che-hsüeh wen-hsüan*[bz] (Selections from Chinese Philosophy Throughout the Ages). 4 vols. (Peking: Chung-hua Bookstore, 1962–1963). *Chung-kuo li-tai che-hsüeh wen-hsüan hui-pien* (Collected Selections on Chinese Philosophy Throughout the Ages) (Peking: Chung-hua Bookstore, 1963). *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih tzu-liao hui-pien* (Collected Materials on the History of Chinese Philosophy) (Peking: Chung-hua Bookstore, 1963).

[26]Editorial Board of *CHYC*, ed., *Lao Tzu che-hsüeh t'ao-lun chi*[ca] (Symposium on the Philosophy of Lao Tzu) (Peking: Chung-hua Bookstore, 1959). Pp. 502.

concept of *Tao* in materialistic terms on the ground that *Tao* is the basic substance of all things, their necessary nature, the law of change, the condition of existence, and the sum total of things.[27] Others, on the contrary, argued that the concept of *Tao* is idealistic because *Tao* is indescribable, transcends time and space, comes from non-being, is the One and Absolute, and an absolute spirit.[28] Debates on the nature of *Tao* have continued ever since, especially around the expression, "the thing that is called *Tao*," in chapter 21 of the *Lao Tzu*, but the opposing parties have not changed their positions.[29]

Another problem discussed was whether Lao Tzu represented the ruling class. Kuan Feng[ab] and Lin Yü-shih[ac] published a series of three articles presenting Lao Tzu as working for the interest of the declining slave-owner class, who wanted the people to remain ignorant and contented.[30] This view had its adherents. But there were others who held that Lao Tzu reflected the thought of peasants and that he represented their interest.[31] Generally speaking, the attitude toward Lao Tzu was critical.

Re-evaluation of Confucius

Soon after the discussion on Lao Tzu in 1959, attention was turned to Confucius, who was to engage Chinese philosophers in an extensive controversy for three years. From 1960 to 1962, thirteen discussion meetings were held on him in Tsinan[ad] near his birthplace, in Peking, in Canton[ae] in the south, and in Kirin[af] and Heilungkiang[ag] in the northeast. Practically all prominent philosophers took part, including Fung Yu-lan, Kuan Feng, Yang Jung-kuo,[ah] and Jen Chi-yü[ai]. The meeting in Tsinan in November, 1962, attracted more than 160 scholars from sixteen provinces and municipalites.[32] Papers presented at the meetings and published in newspapers and journals were subsequently selected and published in two collections in 1962.[33]

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[27]*Ibid.*, pp. 16, 40, 147–149, 167.

[28]*Ibid.*, pp. 161, 176, 184–185, 300.

[29]Kuan Feng, "An Explanation of the Expression 'The Thing That is Called Tao,'" *KMJP*, June 27, 1961. Fung Yu-lan, "Chapter 21 of the *Lao Tzu* Explained," *ibid.*, July 25, 1961 (also in his *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih lun-wen erh-chi*[cb] (Collected Essays on the History of Chinese Philosophy), 2nd series, (Shanghai: Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1962), pp. 248–252. Chao Chi-pin, "Looking at the Philosophy of Lao Tzu from the Word 'Thing' in the *Lao Tzu*," *KMJP*, October 4, 1961 (also in his *K'un-chih lu*[cc] (Records of Learning Through Hard Work) (Peking: Chung-hua Bookstore, 1963), pp. 133–158. Chiang K'o-yü,[cd] "A Chat on the Problem of Translating the Last Sentence in Chapter 21 of the *Lao Tzu*," *KMJP*, April 12, 1963.

[30]In *CHYC*, No. 6 (June, 1959), and in *Lao Tzu che-hsüeh t'ao-lun chi*, pp. 176– 227.

[31]For the opinion that Lao Tzu was opposed to the people, see T'ang I-chieh, for example, *ibid.*, pp. 125–133. For the opposite opinion, see Jen Chi-yü, *ibid.*, pp. 1–27.

[32]For reports on these meetings, see *KMJP*, October 30, 1961; November 2, 1961; January 21, February 28, March 13, May 20, and July 18, 1962; *Eastern Horizon*, December, 1963, p. 14; and *CHYC*, No. 1 (March, 1964), pp. 61, 64–66, 73–74.

[33]Historical Research Institute, the Shangtung Branch of the Chinese Academy of Science, ed., *K'ung Tzu t'ao-lun wen-chi*[ce] (Symposium on Confucius) (Tsinan: Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1961).

The discussions revolved around six main questions: (1) Confucius' concept of Heaven (*T'ien*[aj]) and its effect at his time, (2) whether he was a materialist or an idealist, (3) his doctrines of *jen*[ak] (humanity, love) and *li*[al] (rites, principles of conduct), (4) his class standpoint, (5) how to evaluate him, and (6) whether he can be interpreted in modern terms.

In a way, these discussions were started by Fung long before the discussion on Lao Tzu. As early as 1956, he had published an article in which he said that Heaven, *li*, and *jen* should be the three basic topics in discussing Confucius.[34] His own belief was that, while Confucius was decidedly an idealist, nevertheless, he was skeptical toward spiritual beings. *Li* consisted of the rectification of names, and that was Confucius' way of using *li* to restrain the ruler. *Jen*, said Fung, represented a true sentiment.

The discussion on Heaven was confined chiefly to the meeting at Kirin in the spring of 1962 which dealt not so much with the metaphysical nature of Heaven but the Heavenly mandate. Scholars differed as to whether the mandate was deterministic or alterable through man's effort at learning and moral cultivation. As to whether Confucius was a materialist or an idealist, he was variously described as an idealist, a subjective idealist with a tendency toward historical materialism, an objective idealist, and a materialist, depending on whether one understood Confucius' Heaven as physical or as an absolute spiritual being, and whether or not the Way of Heaven Confucius spoke of meant physical natural laws.

The debate on *jen* and *li*, however, was quite extensive and uncompromising. Some held that the *jen* of Confucius aimed at the emancipation of slaves,[35] while others held the opposite view.[36] According to Kuan Feng and Lin Yü-shih, Confucius' love was extended only to slave-owners, while Fung insisted that it meant love for all.[37] To Chao Chi-pin[am] and Ch'e Tsai,[an] Confucius' love meant love of one's own class, but to Fung, while this may be true, love possesses in itself a universal character.[38] This view was shared

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Pp. 362. Editorial Board of *CHYC*, ed., *K'ung Tzu che-hsüeh t'ao-lun chi*[cf] (Symposium on the Philosophy of Confucius) (Peking: Chung-hua Bookstore, 1963). Pp. 477.

[34]Fung Yu-lan, *Kuan-yü K'ung Tzu yen-chiu ti chi-ko wen-t'i*[cg] (Several Problems Concerning the Study of Confucius), *KMJP*, November 14, 1956.

[35]For example, Liu Chieh-jen,[ch] "A Preliminary Investigation on the Confucian System of Thought —Confucius' Doctrine of *Jen* as a Theory for the Emancipation of Slaves," *KMJP*, November 1, 1949, p. 59.

[36]For example, Chang Shih-feng,[ci] "The Confucian Doctrine of *Jen* Is Not a Theory for the Emancipation of Slaves," *ibid.*, April 27, 1960.

[37]Kuan Feng and Lin Yü-shih, in *K'ung Tzu che-hsüeh t'ao-lun chi*, pp. 217–270, and Fung in his "On Confucius' Thought on *Jen*," *CHYC*, No. 5 (October, 1961).

[38]Chao Chi-pin and Ch'e Tsai in *K'ung Tzu che-hsüeh t'ao-lun chi*, pp. 162–181, 412–445, and Fung, *ibid.*, pp. 470–473.

by Liu Chieh.[ao][39] Later, Fung supplemented his remarks and said that in a class society there cannot be any *jen* that transcends classes, and, even if it did, it still possesses a class character. But he added that *jen* nonetheless possesses the nature of equality, and in point of fact Confucius treated the peasant in this spirit.[40] As to *li*, it was understood by some as a continuation of traditional feudal rites and therefore supporting slavery, but by others as containing a new element, since Confucius extended it to apply to all people instead of the aristocrats only, as was the case before his time.[41]

Thus, there was no unanimity of opinion. Each proponent would interpret the etymological and philosophical elements of the words "*jen*" and "*li*" to suit his thesis. Historical facts were selected and used to support the argument. Most agreed, however, that there is a progressive element in Confucius. Even Kuan Feng conceded that the Confucian doctrine of *jen* performed a constructive function in the feudal society, since it contributed to the decline of feudalism. The debaters agreed also that Confucius represented the new landlord class instead of the declining slave-owner class. Such a progressive element should be promoted, especially under the guidance of Marxian philosophy, it was contended. In any case, Confucius was a great man in Chinese history and had done a great deal for the Chinese people, particularly in the field of education. As such, he was to be honored and respected. Furthermore, while it was recognized by all that Confucius had many historical limitations and that even his best doctrine did not develop as it should, there is something in him worth preserving. As said, Confucius' *jen*, for example, can be reconstructed and raised to a higher degree so that it will facilitate China's acceptance of Marxism.[42] Since the spring of 1962, there has been a tendency to dress Confucius in a modern, or more particularly Marxian, garment, as if he were an ideal artist, musician, dialectical materialist, etc., but the trend is generally denounced.[43]

Neo-Confucianism Almost Ignored

The philosophy department of Peking University also held meetings to discuss Han Fei[ap] (d. 233 B.C.), as well as Confucius and Lao Tzu; the most outstanding Legalist, Liu Yü-hsi[aq] (722–842) and Liu Tsung-yüan[ar] (773–

[39]Liu Chieh, "Confucius' Doctrine of *Jen*-Only," *CHYC*, No. 3 (June, 1962).

[40]Fung Yu-lan, "On Confucius' Thoughts on *Jen*—Some Supplementary Remarks," *Hsüeh-shu yüeh-k'an*[cj] (Monthly of Learned Studies), No. 8 (1963).

[41]See *K'ung Tzu che-hsüeh t'ao-lun chi*, pp. 96–101.

[42]Kao Tsan-fei,[ck] "*Jen*, the Crux of Confucian Thought," *Wen-shih-che*[cl] (Literature, History, and Philosophy), No. 5, May, 1962.

[43]*CHYC*, No. 1 (February, 1964), p. 61.

819), both hailed as great atheists; Chang Tsai; and Chu Hsi[as] (1130–1200), the greatest Chinese philosopher in China in the last 2,000 years.[44] But these meetings were not national in scope, and exerted little influence. The only other Chinese philosopher honored with public discussion meetings attracting national attention was Wang Fu-chih. In November, 1962, an academic forum was held in Shantung[at] in commemoration of the 270th anniversary of his death. No doubt the honor was paid him because he was a materialist and a rebel against the Neo-Confucianism of Chu Hsi. He was an obscure thinker whose works, more than 77 in number, were not published until the middle of the nineteenth century and therefore had had very little influence on Chinese thought. But he is now a towering figure on the Chinese philosophical scene. Nine books and thirty-one articles have been published on him alone.

In sharp contrast, the most outstanding Neo-Confucianists, notably Ch'eng I[au] (1033–1107) and Chu Hsi, both of whom held that there is a universal principle underlying all existence, and Lu Hsiang-shan[av] (1139–1193) and Wang Yang-ming, both of whom held that this principle is identical with the mind, have been almost completely ignored, in spite of the fact that they have greatly shaped Chinese thought in the last 700 years. There have been only two books and nine articles on them, and the two books are on Chu Hsi's philosophy in Japan. And only four of the articles are of an evaluational nature.[45] It seems that Chang Tsai, Wang Fu-chih, and Tai Chen are the only three Neo-Confucianists worthy of attention.

Fung Yu-lan and Other Contemporaries

But Neo-Confucianism, having been the dominant philosophy in China for such a long time and having been woven into practically every fabric of Chinese life, is not to be obliterated by being ignored. In the last thirty years, the idealistic tendency of the Neo-Confucian Lu-Wang school was continued and developed by Hsiung Shih-li[aw] (1885–). According to him, reality is a constant process of "closing," which is the tendency to integrate into matter, and "opening," which is the tendency to maintain its own nature,

[44] *KMJP*, January 25, 1961.

[45] Chu Ch'ien-chih,[cm] *Jih-pan ti Chu Tzu hsüeh*[cn] (The Chu Hsi School of Philosophy in Japan) (Peking: San-lien Bookstore, 1958). Pp. 457; and his *Jih-pan ti ku-hsüeh yü Yang-ming hsüeh*[co] (The Classical and Wang Yang-ming Schools of Philosophy in Japan) (Shanghai: Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1962). Pp. 388. The articles are: Yang Hsiang-k'uei,[cp] "On Ch'eng Hao,[cq]" 1032–1085, a leading Neo-Confucianist, *Hsüeh-shu yüeh-k'an*, No. 8 (1962); P'an Kao-en,[cr] "On [Ch'eng I's and Chu Hsi's] Doctrines of Investigation of Things and Extension of Knowledge," *Hsin chien-she*, No. 3 (March, 1963); Ho Shan-ch'ün,[cs] "Criticizing Wang Yang-ming's Subjective Idealism," *ibid.*, No. 4 (April, 1957); and K'ung Fan,[ct] "Wang Yang-ming's Subjective Idealistic Philosophical Thought," *Chiao-hsüeh yü yen-chiu*[cu] (Teaching and Research), No. 4 (April, 1962).

resulting in the mind, and the mind, being its own master, is also master of all. The naturalistic tendency of the Neo-Confucian Ch'eng-Chu school was continued and developed by Fung. Hsiung has lived in retirement for a number of years but has managed to publish three books[46] in the last ten years elaborating his philosophy without using any terminology now in vogue or a single reference to current discussions. He may be said to be entirely out of the current today.

Fung, however, is very much in the midst of it. In fact, he is the very center. Since 1949, he has corrected his mistakes and criticized his own thoughts many times.[47] In the 1930s he had developed a "new rational philosophy" in which, as in Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucianism, there is a transcendental principle as the basis of all existence. This has come under severe attack again and again in the last ten years,[48] and Fung has revised, corrected, and even repudiated his own philosophy.[49] But throughout all this he has remained very much himself. We have seen that he created the issue of "abstract meanings" in 1957. Before this issue was settled, he offered a new theory, that of the "form of universality." In the discussion meeting on Confucius in 1962, he declared that Confucius' doctrine of *jen* was presented in the "form of universality," that is, love is to be applied to all. The doctrine had a certain "reality" to the laboring class, even if it was promoted for the benefit of the rulers, because the laboring class also demanded it and the ruling class had to say that it also had meaning for them.[50] The new theory was vigorously attacked as undermining the idea of class struggle and as

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[46]Hsiung Shih-li, *Yüan jü*[cv] (An Investigation on Confucianism), 2 vols. (Shanghai: Lung-men Bookstore, 1956). Pp. 90 and 92; *Ming-hsin p'ien*[cw] (An Essay on Understanding the Mind) (Shanghai: Lung-men Bookstore, 1959). Pp. 232; and *Ch'ien-k'un yen*[cx] (The Evolution of Heaven and Earth), 2 parts, manuscript photographically reproduced (no publisher or place cited), 1961. Pp. 115 and 134.

[47]Fung Yu-lan, "Summary Accounting of a Year's Study," *Hsin-hua yüeh-pao*[cy] (New China Monthly), No. 2 (February, 1950). "Self-criticism Concerning My Past Efforts at the History of Philosophy), *Peking University Journal* (Humanistic Sciences), No. 2 (June, 1956); "To Transform Oneself It Is Necessary to Criticize Oneself," *KMJP*, May 24, 1958; "One Becomes Young Again Once One Realizes One's Past Mistakes," *Jen-min jih-pao*[cz] (People's Daily), April 25, 1959; "On the Criticisms in the Discussion on Confucius and on Criticizing Myself," *CHYC*, No. 6 (December, 1963).

[48]Chang Sui-wu,[da] "Criticizing the Subjective Idealism and the Real Reactionary Nature of [Fung's] *New Rationalistic Philosophy* [1939]," *CHYC*, No. 4 (August, 1956). Yang Hsien-pang,[db] "Criticizing Fung Yu-lan's New Rationalistic Philosophy," *Chiao-hsüeh yü yen-chiu*, No. 10 (October, 1958); Wang Tzu-sung, "Whom Does Fung Yu-lan's Philosophy Serve?" *CHYC*, No. 1 (January, 1959); Jen Hua,[dc] "How the New Rationalistic Philosophy Has Twisted the Viewpoint of New Realism," *Hsin chien-she*, No. 2 (February, 1959); Kuan Feng, "Exposing the Real Nature of Fung's *Hsin yüan-jen*[dd] (A New Treatise on the Nature of Man)—and a Discussion on Mr. Fung's Philosophical System," *CHYC*, No. 2 (February, 1959).

[49]Fung, "On the Differences of the Old and New Philosophies as Seen from My Criticism of My Own New Rationalistic Philosophy," *Hsin chien-she*, No. 12 (December, 1950); "The Real Nature of the New Rationalistic Philosophy," *CHYC*, No. 1 (January, 1959).

[50]Fung, *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih lun-wen erh-chi*, pp. 118–123.

idealistic, although it was conceded that it has a progressive element.[51] To his critics, the love of rulers for the laboring class was but hypocrisy and deceit.[52] Fung was therefore accused as serving the landlord class and the ruling class.[53] In 1962, he also published his new history of Chinese philosophy.[54] This is not a revision of his *History of Chinese Philosophy* written in 1931 but an entirely new work written from the standpoint that the history of Chinese philosophy is a story of the conflict between materialism and idealism. But he has adhered to his idea that the two philosophies penetrate each other.[55] More than that, the volume was written, he said, from the standpoint of the theory of the "form of universality."[56]

At the same time and for the same reason, Liu Chieh was under strong criticism. Early in 1962, he published two articles on the Confucian doctrine of *jen* and the Neo-Confucian doctrine of the unity of Heaven and man.[57] He considers *jen* to be applicable to all types of society, since it is the highest ideal. As the noblest of all feelings, it is extended not only to all humanity but to the point where man and Heaven become identified. In December, 1962, in the meeting on Confucius at Tsinan, he reiterated his opinions. A storm of criticism fell on him. In August, 1963, the Institute for Historical Research of the Chinese Academy of Science held a session on him.[58] He was attacked as an anti-Marxist and a "bourgeois humanitarian." Like Fung, he has been under fire. But the significant point is that, in the face of severe criticism of Fung, Liu came out with essentially the same theory.

One is forced to conclude that profound and age-old doctrines like that of *jen* have too much attraction for the Chinese to be suppressed. Put differently, certain features of Chinese philosophy have a certain degree of tenacity, of which Fung and Liu are but symbols.

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[51]Chang Li-wen,[de] "Discussions on the Problem of 'the Form of Universality,'" *Jen-min jih-pao*, November 26, 1963.

[52]T'ang I-chieh and Sun Ch'ang-chiang,[df] "What is the Real Nature of Mr. Fung's 'Form of Universality?'" *Wen-hui pao*[dg] (Wen-hui Daily), October 15, 1963; Yang Ch'ao,[dh] Li Hsüeh-ch'in,[di] and Chang Ch'i-chih,[dj] "An Investigation on How to Understand the 'Thought That Possesses the Form of Universality,'" *KMJP*, December 22, 1963.

[53]Yang Ch'ao *et al.*, *ibid.*; Fang K'o-li,[dk] "What is the Difference in the Real Nature [of the Form of Universality]?" *CHYC*, No. 6 (December, 1963).

[54]Fung, *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih hsin-pien*[dl] (A New History of Chinese Philosophy), Vol. 1. (Peking: Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1962). Pp. 592.

[55]*Ibid.*, pp. 7–9, 12–44.

[56]Fung, "Doubts On a Theoretical Problem and Request for Enlightenment," *Chiao-hsüeh yü yen-chiu*, No. 4 (April, 1963).

[57]Liu Chieh, "Confucius' Doctrine of *Jen*-Only," *Hsüeh-shu yen-chiu*[dm] (Academic Research), No. 3 (March, 1962). "The Problem of the Unity of Heaven and Man in the History of Chinese Thought," *ibid.*, No. 1 (January, 1962).

[58]See *KMJP*, August 20, 1963.

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陳沫若
胡遲 蘭
郭李馮賀高侯艾北胡紅毛王王呂黃方張理氣王道戴天老道关林濟廣 麟亨外思京繩旗 棗明
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an 車 劉 載
ao 節
ap 韓 劉 非
aq 柳 朱 禹 錫
ar 宗 元
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at 山 程 陸 棗
au 熊 頤
av 秦 象 山
aw 莊 十 力
ax 墨 子
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bb 光 明 日 報
bc 胡 適 思 想 批 判
bd 批 判 胡 適 的 反 動 哲 學 思 想、
be 中 山
bf 哲 學 研 究
bg 梁 漱 溟
bh 梁 漱 溟 思 想 批 判
bi 批 判 梁 漱 溟 的 哲 學 思 想

bj 中國哲學史問題
討論專輯
bk 中國哲學史論文初集
bl 上海
bm 吳傳啟
bn 齊良驥
bo 新建設
bp 卢俊忠
bq 湯一介
br 張岱年
bs 中國唯物主義思想簡史
bt 楊與順
bu 関于中國哲學史中的
唯物主義傳統
bv 中國哲學史參考資料
bw 中國思想通史
bx 中國哲學史畧
by 中國哲學史資料選輯
bz 中國歷代哲學文選
ca 老子哲學討論集
cb 中國哲學史論文二集
cc 困知錄
cd 華可瑜
ce 孔子討論文集
cf 孔子哲學討論集
cg 関于孔子研究的
几个問題
ch 劉介人
ci 章士风
cj 學术月刊
ck 高贊非
cl 文史哲
cm 朱謙之
cn 日本的朱子學
co 日本的古學與陽明學
cp 楊向奎
cq 程顥
cr 潘高恩
cs 何善群
ct 孔繁
cu 教學的研究
cv 原儒
cw 明心篇
cx 乾坤衍
cy 新華月報
cz 人民日報
da 張遂五
db 楊宪邦
dc 任华
dd 新原人
de 張立文
df 孙長江
dg 文汇報
dh 楊超
di 李學勤
dj 張岂之
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dl 中國哲學史新編
dm 學术研究

KARL H. POTTER

The Naturalistic Principle of Karma

INDIAN WRITERS conversant with Western thought have compared the "Law of *Karma*" with the "Law of Causation," saying that, whereas the latter governs the physical order, the former governs the moral order.[1] In this conception several mistaken views about the so-called "Law of Causation" are apparent.

In the first place, the phrase "the Law of Causation" is highly misleading. There are two well-known senses of "law," and in neither one does the doctrine under discussion, viz., "every event has a cause," state a law. The "Law of Causation" is not a prescriptive law, since a prescriptive law presupposes a lawgiver. If there were a lawgiver for the "Law of Causation," it presumably would have to be God. But consider a God who promulgates the Causal Law "Every event must have a cause." Why should he promulgate such a law? A prescriptive law is intended to compel people to act or restrain people from acting in certain ways, and this edict can do nothing of the kind. God may have created the world in such a fashion that every event indeed does have a cause, either by some necessity within the scheme or even as a result of his continuous and direct intervention, but it does not follow from that, even if it be true, that he issued a prescriptive law to that effect.

Nor is the "Law of Causation" a descriptive law. For a descriptive law, a "law of Nature" like Boyle's law, for example, is arrived at when a hypothesis is constantly confirmed and never falsified. But the "hypothesis" "every event has a cause" is not treated like ordinary hypotheses; apparent falsifications are disallowed on principle. Whereas an ordinary hypothesis is rejected when the outcome of a properly-carried-out and relevant test is negative, the causal "hypothesis" is safeguarded: if we fail to find a cause for a given event, we are advised to keep looking; we are not allowed to reject the principle.

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[1]E.g., S. C. Chatterjee, *The Fundamentals of Hinduism* (Calcutta: Das Gupta & Co., 1950; reprinted 1960), pp. 72 ff.; Mysore Hiriyanna, *Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy* (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1952), pp. 30–34; *Collected Papers of Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri*, T. M. P. Mahadevan, ed., (Madras: University of Madras, 1961), pp. 233–238.

Thus the "Law of Causation" is not a law at all, but a principle. As such, it serves an extremely important function: it formulates a basic presupposition of scientific inquiry, since any empirical inquiry seeks for explanations, and all such explanations are in a broad sense causal.[2]

If the "Law of *Karma*" is to be thought of as parallel in function to the "Law of Causation," it, too, must be viewed as a principle, a principle which formulates a certain program for moral inquiry. As such, it, too, serves an extremely important function. For, just as the causal principle, as I shall hereafter call "Every event has a cause," exhorts us to keep on seeking explanations for physical occurrences, so the karmic principle exhorts us to keep on seeking explanations for what I shall for the moment call "moral" occurrences.

As a result, neither the "Law of Causation" nor the "Law of *Karma*" governs its respective orders, since they are both principles, i.e., exhortations or, if you prefer, programmatic decisions, and so cannot govern anything except in the sense of guiding our future inquiries.

Far from detracting from the importance of the doctrine of *karma*, these considerations underline its ultimacy for human concerns. For the fact that we are committed to the causal principle indicates our basic desire for explanations of physical occurrences, and likewise, if one is committed to the karmic principle, this shows one's desire for explanations of moral occurrences. And, although it seems prima facie that the status of a principle is inferior to that of a law, since principles are rejectable and laws are not, second thoughts will reveal that this supposed inferiority is a trivial outcome of the fact that in our language-habits we allow ourselves to speak of a rejected principle, while a rejected law is no law at all.

Why should one, however, be committed to the karmic principle? Well, why are scientists committed to the causal principle? Scientists give different answers: some see the practical advantages accruing from control of the sources of physical energy as a relevant reason; others prefer to maintain a lofty disdain for human concerns, at least while in their laboratories. Likewise, one might accept the karmic principle on the impersonal grounds that he is merely interested in the moral order and not in any applications to human conduct his investigations might afford, at least while the investigation is in progress. Scientists treasure their attitude of "objectivity" and feel that practical concerns threaten to cloud the clarity of their vision. Psychol-

[2]The word "causal" is currently out of fashion in empiricist circles, and discussion at the moment rages over the question of an inductivist versus a deductivist account of verification and falsification. These discussions do not bear upon anything claimed here, however.

ogists, even moral philosophers, may take an equally antiseptic stance if they like. But the only result is that they separate their activities as investigators from their activities as inquiring persons with practical concerns, and by so doing take the chance that attention to those concerns may proceed as if their laboratory results do not exist. Such a view of the scientist as functioning under two hats, so to speak, seems to be the result of a failure to see that objectivity does not require suspension of practical concerns but, rather, strict observance of the canons of successful inquiry. Practical concerns generate the questions we ask; they also, in the final analysis, generate the criteria we use for deciding whether or not our questions have been answered; but neither consideration justifies the conclusion that such an inquiry is unobjective.

Just as man's predicament dictates an investigation of the sources of physical power with an eye to adjusting to or even mastering such power, so the very same predicament necessitates an investigation into the sources of moral strength with intent to master such sources of self-control as can be discovered. The karmic principle stands justified simply by our need to understand ourselves.

In effect, the karmic principle merely makes explicit a vagueness in the causal principle, a vagueness in the notion of an "event" in "Every event has a cause." We have seen that this principle might less misleadingly be phrased "Keep looking for causal explanations of all events." But what are to count as "events"? At this point the various scientific practitioners begin demarcating their respective fields. The karmic principle insists that the field of moral events not be overlooked.

The acceptance of the karmic principle is incompatible with no laws of conduct, not being a law itself. It does, however, conflict with certain alternative principles, specifically with those philosophical positions which deny the existence of moral occurrences, or, while admitting the existence of such occurrences, deny the relevance of causal explanation to them. Such views are characteristic of non-naturalism in contemporary ethical theory. Acceptance of the karmic principle requires one to adopt the position of naturalism in ethics.

The question at issue in assessing naturalism is not one of the truth or falsity of a doctrine, but, rather, one concerning the acceptability of a principle as guiding our investigative policy. As a result, some of the more superficial aspects of contemporary debate may be overlooked in favor of a more searching analysis of men's motives in denying, or affirming, that there are moral occurrences and that they are subject to causal explanation.

The motivation for the naturalist, he who espouses the karmic principle, is the same as that which motivates him to accept the causal principle: he believes that understanding the causes of any event enables him to anticipate and adjust to subsequent events of a like nature, and he further believes that anticipation of and adjustment to future events is a worth-while human concern. The naturalist fears unexplained events, for they are beyond human control. But he trusts man's ability to overcome the limitations of ignorance. Naturalism, then, posits the principle that all areas of human interest can be eventually mastered through scientific inquiry, and, since the area of moral decisions is central in human striving, he refuses to remove it from the scope of scientific investigation.

The motivation for non-naturalism may seem to stem from several sources. But the major source is the fear of explained events. The fear is that if we knew all the causes of all events we would know precisely what the future will bring, a self-stultifying and debilitating prospect. Thus, although the non-naturalist admits the wisdom of seeking causal explanations within limits, he opposes such a search in the area which lies closest to human decisions, the area of what I have been calling "moral events."

Though this is not the only professed motive for non-naturalism, other reasons for the view seem to come to much the same thing in the end. Naturalism may be opposed, for example, on the ground that human understanding, unlike God's, has intrinsic limitations, that any attempt by man to go beyond his own limits and emulate God's understanding is doomed to failure, and that rash claims on behalf of man's complete perfectibility in this regard are blasphemous. All this seems to be a rationalization of the fear noted in the previous paragraph. Why should anyone object to an investigation of any sort of events, unless he believes that such an investigation will produce some positive harm? And what sort of harm, other than the realization of the debilitating prospect mentioned above, could possibly accrue from rational inquiry, the same kind of inquiry, after all, which even the non-naturalist admits to be appropriate and desirable everywhere else except here?

Yet the problem, once recognized, is genuine enough. If non-naturalists are to be persuaded to give up their view, they will have to be convinced either (1) that complete understanding of the causes of all events will still not enable us to predict the future completely and with finality, or (2) that such complete predictive ability, far from being the stultifying prospect the non-naturalist assumes it to be, is indeed precisely the state of perfection man should aim for. The first thesis is a kind of indeterminism, the second a seem-

ingly paradoxical account of human freedom as a state in which no choice at all is open.

Among the ancient *darśanas* of India one can make out a distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism. This distinction is one which I have elsewhere called the difference between "progress philosophy" and "leap philosophy."[3] In Sanskrit the former is called "*jāti-vāda*," the latter "*ajāti-vāda*." The cleavage is fundamental. The leap philosophers, or non-naturalists, refuse to allow causal explanations as relevant to some part of human endeavors, restricting causal categories to only a part of the events which concern men. The remaining part, unamenable to rational understanding, is treated in varying ways by Indian non-naturalists. Some, e.g., Mādhyamika Buddhists and the Vivaraṇa branch of the Advaita Vedānta, postulate a second sort of understanding (often called *prajñā*) to grasp these acausal categories. Other non-naturalists take refuge in theism, for example, the Śrīvaiṣṇavite interpretation of Rāmānuja and Madhva's Dvaita. Under the impetus of what is now referred to as the "*bhakti* movement," non-naturalism of this latter sort, which features dependence on the grace of God, has become increasingly prevalent in India. The result has been that the concerns served by adherence to the karmic principle have been more and more ignored in favor of a resigned attribution to God of responsibility for human failings. In a context of non-naturalism, the "Law of *Karma*" loses its meaning as a principle and indeed takes on a strongly fatalistic flavor. That was not its original intent, however.

Readers unacquainted with the cleavage in the history of ideas in India sketched above may well be puzzled when they find Hiriyanna and Chatterjee at one and the same time disclaiming deterministic consequences for the "Law of *Karma*" and yet apparently admitting that the "Law" entails that every event is completely determined—all the while apparently failing to see the contradictions involved in these views. Suryanarayana Sastri is more insightful, seeing rightly the naturalistic implications of the "Law" and the inadequacy of the non-naturalists' answer. His own solution on behalf of naturalistic (*Bhāmatī*) Advaita is, unfortunately, not satisfactory, either. With the dubious authority of Eddington, he appeals to the principle of indeterminacy to justify indeterminism. But he, like the other two, fails to see what has been argued above, that the "Law of *Karma*" is not a law but a principle which, so long as it is maintained, commits us to seeking a deterministic

[3]See "A Fresh Classification of Indian Philosophical Systems," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXI, No. 1 (November, 1961), 25–32; the distinction is further expounded in my book *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).

order beneath the quantum order or whatever other incompletely determined order science may arrive at through further investigation.

Meeting the non-naturalist by espousing indeterminism is to throw out the baby with the bath. In the remainder of this paper, I wish to propose an interpretation of the karmic principle which may help naturalists forge an answer along the second line mentioned above, by resolving the paradox of human freedom.

What are these "moral events" the causal explanations of which the karmic principle exhorts us to seek? I suggest that they are habits (or traces), or perhaps the sources of habituation (*saṁskāra*, *bhāvanā*, *vāsanā*).[4] It is a fact, well known to reflective men the world over, that many of the frustrations in life are due to our inability to deviate at the appropriate moment from habits built up prior to the moment of decision. This, then, is the bondage to *karma*, habit, which thwarts human freedom even when no "external" constraint is present.

The karmic principle exhorts us particularly to seek the necessary conditions of habituation. The idea is that, having discovered the kinds of events which constitute the necessary conditions of habituation, we can proceed to ensure that those kinds of events do not recur. As a result, we will be released from bondage to habits, and this release is itself a necessary condition (perhaps even a sufficient condition) for *mokṣa*, complete release from all dependence on the not-self.

When the self attains complete release it will be omniscient in the sense that it will be able to predict the state of the world at every moment in the future (and no doubt to postdict for every moment in the past). This is the conception of man's goal which the non-naturalist finds so repugnant, apparently because no choice is open to such an omniscient being. But this phrase, "no choice is open," is unclear and in need of analysis, and upon such analysis it will turn out that the non-naturalist, misled by crucial ambiguities in terms like "habit," rejects this naturalistic conception of freedom on inadequate grounds.

There are two sorts of situations in which it would be strictly appropriate to say "no choice is open to me." One is the situation where the alternatives are limited to one. The closest approximation to this situation in ordinary experience is the stock example of the man forced to give up his wallet at gunpoint, but this is, of course, strictly speaking, not a case in point since obviously one does have more than one alternative in this situation,

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[4]Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–83, notes the parallels between *karma* and habit without quite identifying them.

though the other alternative—probably being shot—is very unpleasant. Now, it is reasoned, restriction of alternatives even to this extent is highly undesirable—how much worse if it were strictly true that only one alternative were open. Note how the repugnance we exhibit at being forced to do something against our will is carried over into the stricter case, although no reason is given why the description "alternatives limited to one" must be taken to apply only to cases where the "alternative" in question is contrary to our wishes.

A second situation answering strictly to "no choice is open" is the situation where indeed no choice is open, since choosing is not in point, because of the intrinsic character of the situation. An approximation to this might be found in experiences of severe depression where, since nothing seems more worth-while than anything else, choosing seems out of point and one relapses into catatonia. Again, this is not strictly a case of the situation in question, since one could well say of such a depressive, "Nevertheless, choices are open to him, including the choice not to do anything at all." Again the example is highly repellent, and this quality is easily carried over to that which it is taken to approximate. Again, note that the resignation characteristic of the catatonic is carried over into the strict case, although nothing is provided as sanction for this identification.

Now let us return to "habit." Moral advisors show a curious contrariness in their attitudes to habit. Such a counselor advises us, on the one hand, not to be a slave to habits; on the other, to develop habits. An overly regular life is bad, but so is an underregulated one. One may well suspect from this that important distinctions are being overlooked in connection with this notion. Surely we are not being advised to develop the same things we are at the same time to dispense with?

We are insufficiently clear about habituation. Western moralists tend to say here that the problem which the foregoing remarks point up is the problem of telling which habits are good and which ones bad. This way of speaking makes it sound as if there were properties of "goodness" and "badness" which characterize two distinct classes of habits, and that our problem is to classify habits into these two varieties by discovering the presence of these properties. But since one cannot assume that any observable features of habits are signs of the presence of goodness and badness—to do so would be to move from an "is" to an "ought" or to commit the "naturalistic fallacy"—the non-naturalist goes on to conclude that one must intuit the presence of these properties directly. Having intuited which habits are good, one is then exhorted to develop these habits. No causal explanations are necessary or

desirable, for the non-naturalist does not desire to eliminate habits but, rather, to develop certain ones and to abandon others.

The weaknesses in this account should be evident. First, the assumption that goodness and badness are intrinsic and mutually exclusive features of two kinds of moral occurrences is open to question. Second, the appeal to intuition is suspect, particularly when the non-naturalist is apparently unable to give any criteria for discriminating good habits from bad ones. Finally, the non-naturalist does not explain how we are to develop certain habits and abandon others without learning and utilizing causal laws concerning these habits. Note that these weaknesses have nothing to do with the move from "is" to "ought" or with the "naturalistic fallacy." The naturalist may well admit that, if it were in point to seek goodness and badness in habits, these maneuvers would be mistakes. But his position, properly understood, is that such a search is unnecessary.

The problem is not to discriminate between good and bad habits. It is, rather, to avoid habituation, i. e., to avoid losing control of one's habits. Thus the *Bhagavad-gītā* tells us that both good and bad habits bind us. Bondage, habituation, is a feature of all kinds of habits, good and bad.[5] But, fortunately, it is not an intrinsic feature.

Let us distinguish "habituation$_1$," meaning the state of behaving in a regular pattern, from "habituation$_2$," meaning the state of behaving in regulated ways determined by forces beyond one's control. Thus a regular smoker is habituated$_1$, but may or may not be habituated$_2$, depending on whether he can control his smoking as and when he wishes, e.g., whether he can stop at will for a given period.

The presence or absence of habituation$_2$, as well as of habituation$_1$, is a matter of natural fact and involves no special non-naturalistic intuition. Likewise, discovery of the necessary conditions for habituation$_2$ is a proper matter for scientific investigation; we need no occult powers to carry it out. And, finally, utilizing this discovery to free ourselves from habituation$_2$ is no different kind of problem from any other problem of applied science. Such utilization may well involve habituation$_1$. *Yoga*, for example, is the development of habituation$_1$ in order to eliminate habituation$_2$.

Now, with such a clarification of "habit" in mind, it can be seen that the naturalistic conception of freedom as man's goal is not as unpleasant a state to aim for as the non-naturalist claims it to be. Once we have seen that

[5]The *Gītā* finds three kinds of habits: good (*sattva*), passionate (*rajas*), and indifferent (*tamas*). But they all bind. See III. 5 and II. 45.

habituation need not involve loss of control to the not-self, we can see that in a state of perfect freedom we might be habituated$_1$ to the extent that "no choice is open," and yet it will not follow that someone or something else is making our choices for us. No choice is open to us in such a state precisely because we are in complete control of ourselves and thus cannot be distracted by desires arising from alien sources. We will not have resigned ourselves to external control; rather, we will have renounced choice because we will have renounced all desires arising from the not-self.

There are other principles that Indian naturalists accept as corollaries to the karmic principle. Prominent among these is the doctrine of reincarnation or transmigration of the self. In judging the worth of such a doctrine, we should first reconstrue it as a principle, assess its function as such, and then judge the other aspects as critically as we wish to. Thus, I have tried above to explain the function of the karmic principle, but I remain critical of some of the specific ways in which this principle has been rendered for popular consumption. For example, the tracing of specific effects to specific previous acts must either be independently justified through proper investigation or, if not, it must be construed as a picturesque way of reminding people of the concerns which lead them to adopt the karmic principle. In this latter guise, the doctrine of *karma* need not be taken any more seriously by thoughtful people than any similar myth.

Likewise, the doctrine of transmigration seems to be a mixture of mythical elements with an extremely important naturalistic principle. The karmic principle "keep looking for causes of habituation$_2$" requires as corollary what may be called the principle of beginninglessness, which allows us to continue exploring earlier events as possible causes for habituation$_2$ when we have run out of candidates among later events. Thus the principle of beginninglessness extends the scope of the search for causal explanations throughout time, as it were. The principle underlying transmigration includes the principle of beginninglessness and, so to speak, expands it. It allows us when exploring the causes of the habituation$_2$ of an individual inhabiting a certain space-time region to look for such causes in any and all space-time regions prior to the behavior in question.

As a result, it allows us, if we wish, to construe the history of an individual person as extending without spatial or temporal restriction. Thus, if we wish so to construe my history we could include in that history all factors which have in any way conditioned my habituation$_2$, whether such factors are located in this physical body I now possess or in another body or in no body whatsoever. Whether we wish to construe the concept of a "person" in such a way is a matter for us to decide; there are clearly drawbacks to such a way of

speaking, prominent among them the fact that it would involve a serious deviation from current usage and consequent obstruction of communication. Such drawbacks are not conclusive reasons against reforming our conceptual scheme, however. If through such a reform there were clear advantages to be gained in discovering explanations for habituation$_2$, for example, this would outweigh all other considerations for the naturalist.

It is quite possible that a thorough rethinking of the problem of personal identity along these lines would be beneficial. But seriously to construe the history of an individual person in some fashion short of complete interpenetration of his history with the histories of other individuals, at least in the absence of any further distinctions bearing upon the successful functioning of the karmic principle, is to lose sight of that principle. For this reason, one cannot seriously accept the special theory of transmigration as found in popular Indian classics, where we are told that the Buddha was a deer in a former birth, etc. However, I do not suppose that such tales are intended "seriously"; they are myths, and as such serve an indispensable function in disseminating the karmic principle and its corollaries to all mankind.

The corollary to the karmic principle which I have been discussing seems, rather than providing a basis for a more perspicuous account of personal individuality, to provide a basis for understanding to what extent we are bound to each other and to the "impersonal" environment by mutual concerns. Instead of discrete chains of events paralleling each other back through time from each of our presently functioning bodies, we must, rather, learn to think of our histories as interpenetrating fields of force (to suggest one among several models), and of the events influencing the development of those fields as being located, not in a "moral" or "spiritual" realm distinct from the physical one, but in the one world of Nature, the world studied from various angles by physics, biology, history, the arts, and religion. Love, mutual concern, is not to be considered as restricted to some non-natural realm; it can and must be investigated by all the various fields of inquiry. Furthermore, along these lines we may be able to make naturalistic sense of universal insights currently construed non-naturalistically, such as the insight that through love for others one may successfully combat habituation$_2$.

The decline of naturalism in India is particularly unfortunate, for it is Indian naturalists who have most clearly noted the consequences of that position for the ultimate goals of mankind. Western naturalists, under the influence of a shallow Humean and Millian libertarianism, have most often failed to recognize the implications of the causal principle for self-realization.

Indian philosophy is now identified with non-naturalism by practically all Western philosophers, despite its pioneering work on the naturalistic side of the ledger. One would hope to see a revival of naturalism in India, a naturalism sophisticatedly aware of developments in Western ethical theory but emphasizing the unique contributions of Indian moral teachings as classically expounded in such naturalistic texts as the *Bhagavad-gītā* and Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra.* Such a revival would constitute a most important advance in the resolution of the deep-seated issues which divide naturalists from non-naturalists throughout the philosophical world.

What, then, are the philosophical implications of the doctrine of *karma?* The most fundamental implication is that the human predicament requires us to view our world naturalistically, i.e., as governed by discoverable regularities. Only by so viewing the world can we hope to free ourselves from the suffering which, by common consent of all Indian systems, Hindu, Buddhist, and Jaina, pervades our lives. It is worth noting that those Indian philosophers who have allowed themselves to suggest that the doctrine of *karma* is only a convenient fiction have tended to be either skeptics or extreme devotionalists. These latter types of philosophers characteristically abandon the traditional Indian ideal of salvation through liberation, either by outright denial of its possibility, as in the case of the skeptics, or by substituting other ideals in its place, as in the medieval ideal of slavery to God (*kaiñkārya*).

Indeed, *karma*, the naturalistic principle, is not a doctrine with philosophical implications so much as a presupposition of what is to count as a philosophical implication. When the presupposition of *karma* is withdrawn, we quickly leave the characteristic concerns of classical Indian philosophy for the quite different concerns of medieval and modern Indian theology. The cleavage between naturalism and non-naturalism is fundamental. There is no more important choice to be made by those seeking a philosophy of life than that between these two methodological assumptions.

TERESINA ROWELL HAVENS

Mrs. Rhys Davids' Dialogue with Psychology (1893-1924)

"THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION of consciousness is, I venture to think, better understood as a mental electrification of the organism than in terms of any other natural force." [1]

This was written forty years ago, before electroencephalograms had been heard of. The author, Mrs. Caroline Rhys Davids, was both a student of psychology and a pioneer translator of early Buddhist texts from Pāli into English. The passage quoted above illustrates two characteristics of her early scholarly work: (1) her concern to find the most precise available equivalent in the scientific thought of her own time to convey various aspects of the Pāli Buddhist view of how the mind works; and (2) the extent to which she was ahead of her time.

It often happens that a scholar's work will be ignored for many years and then suddenly become relevant to the concerns of a much later epoch. It is the thesis of the present article that this has been true of Mrs. Rhys Davids, and that the time has now come when her earlier work can enter into a fruitful dialogue with the thought of our age.

WHY HER WORK HAS BEEN IGNORED

The cultural time-gap was complicated in her case by personal problems. For one thing, her time failed to provide a community of scholars—Orientalists or others—interested in psychology who might have taken her hypotheses seriously enough to undertake to disprove or to modify them in scholarly debate. For another, her most creative period was over before many Western psychologists and psychotherapists had come to be interested in what they could learn from Buddhist approaches to mental and emotional processes. Unfortunately, or so it appears from our present perspective, Mrs.

[1] Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology: An Inquiry into the Analysis and Theory of Mind in Pali Literature* (2nd ed., London: Luzac and Co., 1924), p. 16.

Rhys Davids herself moved during the 20s from her early interest in the psychological to a preoccupation with the psychic, inspired by the death of her only son in the First World War. This interest led her to stress texts dealing with clairvoyance, clairaudience, and communication with "other worlds" to a degree unacceptable to the predominant Western academic frame of reference, at the time she was writing and now. (We need not speak of circles interested in ESP and psychical research, since they did not and do not impinge heavily on the academic world.) Her interest in these directions took such an increasingly predominant place in her later books that scholars could no longer take her conclusions seriously. This led to the ignoring also of her earlier, more scholarly studies in Buddhist psychology.

Her Early Interest in Psychology

Since most of this early solid work was as editor and translator of Pāli texts, it is chiefly in Introductions and footnotes that her ideas may be found. Regarding the early awakening of her psychological interest, the following note appears in the Introduction to *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics:*

> Even a superficial inspection of the Manual should yield great promise to anyone interested in the history of psychology. When . . . my attention was first drawn to it . . . by Professor Rhys Davids, I was at once attracted by the amount of psychological material embedded in its pages.[2]

In a series of long introductory essays in each successive volume of *Kindred Sayings*[3] and *Gradual Sayings*,[4] she relates her detailed study of technical Pāli terms to her broad interests in the workings of the human mind, Western as well as Eastern. This feeling for wider implications is reflected in the following query from her Introduction to *Buddhist Psychology:*[5] "How far does the greater richness of Buddhist intellectual nomenclature correspond to a greater manifold in modes of knowing or of knowledge?" In other

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[2]Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids, ed., *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics of the Fourth Century B.C.*, being A Translation, now made for the First Time, from the Original Pali, of the First Book in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* entitled *Dhamma-Saṅgaṇi* (Compendium of States or Phenomena) (1st ed., London: Royal Asiatic Society. Oriental Translation Fund. New Series. Vol. XII. 1900), p. xvi.

[3]Mrs. Rhys Davids, ed., *The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Saṁyutta-Nikāya)*. 5 vols. Vols. I and II translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids; Vols. III, IV, and V translated by F. L. Woodward (London: Pali Text Society, 1917, 1922, 1925, 1927, 1930).

[4]Mrs. Rhys Davids, ed., *The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Anguttara-Nikāya)*. 5 vols. Vols. I, II, and V translated by F. L. Woodward; Vols. III and IV translated by E. M. Hare (London: Pali Text Society, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936).

[5]Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 120.

words, does a distinction of terms for which we have no equivalents indicate potential levels of inner experience of which we are unaware? Could a Westerner experience these subtleties if he pursued Buddhist training? Supposing that he did experience distinctions of psychic reality corresponding to the terms in question, how could he translate them into English or communicate them verbally to a person whose culture has no words for them? One of the best examples of this kind of problem is the still-vexing term *jhāna*, which has suffered through a series of mistranslations such as "trance," "ecstasy," "musing," etc. The difficulty lies deeper than the merely verbal. Is it possible that no adequate English term has been found because we have no precisely equivalent discipline in Western religious tradition?

These are the kinds of questions which interdisciplinary research today could begin to answer by combining the resources of Western psychology, anthropology, and linguistics with both Pāli expertness and living Buddhist experience. This collaboration seems more feasible, now that subjective data are becoming recognized by some scientific psychologists in the West as proper material for investigation.

Although her times were not ripe for this sort of dialogue, Mrs. Rhys Davids realized in her work of translation that technical psychological terms —on the English as well as on the Pāli side—are part of a system with certain assumptions about the nature of mind. Therefore, if the translator is to communicate with Western readers, she must know, not only what a given technical term means in Pāli, but also the technical connotation of its English equivalent in current psychological systems. Hence, Mrs. Rhys Davids dug into British psychological works to ascertain as far as possible the exact connotations of such terms as "cognition," "sensation," "feeling," "perception," and "faculties."[6] Many footnotes and entire articles were concerned with working out the closest equivalents for such terms as "*viññāna*," "*indriya*," "*āyatana*," "*upādāna*," and the like. At the same time, she was extremely careful to avoid premature parallels. For example, in discussing the technical meaning of *rūpaṁ* she notes:

> *Rūpaṃ* would . . . appear at first sight to be a name for the external world or for the extended universe, as contrasted with the unextended, mental, psychical or subjective universe. Personally I do not find, so far, that the Eastern and Western concepts can be so easily made to coincide. It will be better before, and indeed without as yet, arriving at any such conclusive judgment, to inquire into the application made of the term in the Manual generally.[7]

[6]Parallel research in the 1960s would find it necessary to re-examine such translations as "illusion," "repressionist," and other terms which have come to have a particular technical meaning in the Freudian system today.

[7]Mrs. Rhys Davids, Introduction to *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, p. xlii.

She explored the backgrounds of psychological inquiry in ancient Greece as well as in pre-Buddhist India in order to evaluate the significance of the Buddhist discoveries. For example, she considers the *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*'s analysis of types of sensation to be ". . . the *first academic formulation* of a theory of sense which ancient India has hitherto produced for us. There is no such analysis of sensation . . . put forward in any Indian book of an equally early date."[8]

She quotes from Siebeck's *Geschichte der Psychologie*[9] concerning Empedokles' theory of sensation or sense-cognition, and observes that Demokritus regarded all sensation as either bare touch or development of touch—a view which, she notes, "is borne out to a great extent by modern biological research." [10]

"Psychologizing Without a Psyche"

As she dug deeper into both the technical Buddhist analysis of states of mind and the over-all system behind it, she was struck by the paradoxical truth that Buddhism stresses conscious will, attention, feeling, choice—"just those mental activities . . . which seem most to imply a subject, or subjective unity *who* attends, feels, wills and chooses. And yet this same philosophy is emphatically one that attempts to 'extrude the ego.' "[11]

> It is this psychologizing without a psyche that impressed me from the first, and seemed to bring the work, for all its remoteness in other respects, nearer to our own Experiential school of and since Locke, than anything we find in Greek traditions.[12]

> And if there was one thing which moved the Master to quit his wonted serenity and wield the lash of scorn and upbraiding, it was just the reading into this convenient generalization of mind or personality that "metaphysical concept of a soul, mind-atom, or mind-stuff," which is put aside by the modern psychologist.[13]

This vehement, almost violent anti-substantialism of early Buddhism stimulated her to look into Aristotle's *De Anima* in order to contrast his notions of "soul" and "substance" with the Buddhist. Her subsequent reflections, as set down in the Introductory Essay prefacing *Buddhist Psychological*

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. li. (Author's italics.)
[9] Hermann Siebeck, *Geschichte der Psychologie* (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1880), Vol. I, p. 107.
[10] *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, p. lvi.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. lxx. (Author's italics.)
[12] *Ibid.*, p. lxxiii.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. lxxi. (Quotation marks in text.)

Ethics,[14] can only be summarized here. (The Buddhist *Manual* was probably written during Aristotle's childhood.)

Aristotle, in applying his theory of mind as a potential "form" which energizes the body, went far "to resolve mind into phenomenal processes."[15] "But he did not, or would not, wrench himself radically out of the primitive soil . . . as the Buddhist dared to do."[16] Hence, Greek thought remained "saturated with substantialist methods"[17a] and passed them on to the medieval world strengthened by the "animistic standpoint" of the Patristic Christian philosophy.

> Modern science, however, has been gradually training the popular mind to a phenomenalistic point of view, and joining hands in psychology with the anti-substantialist tradition of Hume.[17b]

Mrs. Rhys Davids then proceeds to consider a deeply-ingrained tendency of the human mind which lends support to the "philosophical elaboration of soul-theory into Substantialism," namely, the tendency to subsume the particular under the general:

> That is to say, this perceiving and judging, by way of generalizing and unifying, is the only way by which we are able to master the infinite diversities and approximate uniformities of phenomena. . . . Knowledge groups all phenomena under a few aspects of all but supreme generality. . . .
>
> But, after all, this is only the ideal *method* and *economy* of intellect. The stenographer's ideal is to compress recorded matter into the fewest symbols by which he can reproduce faithfully. . . . Psychology teaches us to distinguish our fetches of abstraction and generalization for what they are *psychologically*—i.e. for effective mental shorthand. . . . The philosophical concept of the One is pregnant with powerful associations. To what extent is it simply . . . a mathematical symbol in a hypothetical cosmos of carefully selected data, whence the infinite concrete is eliminated lest it "should flow in over us" and overwhelm us?[18]

Here Mrs. Rhys Davids has anticipated the approach of several contemporary Western writers to an understanding of the functional anti-conceptualism of Zen. How many obscure scholars may have received stimulation from her introduction to the *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi* it is impossible to guess, but it did not enter into a stream of dialogue, partly because neither the philosophy of process nor phenomenological psychology (i.e., concerned with the

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[14] *Ibid.*, pp. xv-xcv.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. xxxviii, referring to Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, chaps. vii, viii.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. xxxviii.

[17] *Ibid.*, (two references.)

[18] *Ibid.*, p. xl. (Author's italics.) She quotes the phrase "should flow in over us" from page 351 of the text following her introduction.

subject's own experience as starting point) had yet come into prominence. Had she been writing today, she might have found a parallel to the Buddhist approach in Harry Stack Sullivan's and other contemporary psychologists' protests against what they consider the out-dated notion of an inner psyche. For Sullivan, "personality" or "individuality" is a hypothetical entity postulated to account for dynamic interpersonal processes and relationships.[19] Mrs. Rhys Davids called attention to this problem—common to Buddhism and to nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology—of distinguishing between a metaphysical concept of the soul and a functional phenomenological one. She noted that Ward had revived the concept of an Ego or Subject of mental states, and that all psychologists, even Hume, find it necessary to assume some sort of a mind or conscious subject as a psychological but not a metaphysical concept. In much the same way, she pointed out, Buddhists use the following terms as convenient fictions:[20]

attabhāvo—selfhood or personality, for which Buddhaghosa himself half apologizes;
ajjhatikaṁ—belonging to the self, subject;
cittaṁ, *mano*, and *viññānam*—"the mind" or "thinking."

In order to avoid the use of "*attā*" (Pāli for "*ātman*," which carried the implication of a permanent, static entity outside of causal relations), they were careful, especially in the nominative case, to use the expression "*svayaṁ*" (this one). In oblique cases, "*attā*" was usually retained, as she herself noted in a footnote.[21] This fact becomes of significance for Mrs. Rhys Davids' later reversal of position. In her later works,[22] she picked out a number of references to "*attā*" in the accusative or other oblique cases and re-translated it as "The Self," "Soul," or "God Within," whereas she or other translators had previously rendered it as a simple reflexive. How did this change in her emphasis come about?

Recovery of "Becoming"

We have seen with what open eyes the youthful scholar confronted the full contradiction or paradox involved in the Buddhist position. As she grew older, however, this dialectical "psychologizing without a psyche" no longer

[19]Patrick Mullahy, *The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan* (New York: Hermitage House, 1952), pp. 16–22.
[20]*A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, p. lxxi.
[21]*Ibid.*, note 3.
[22]See especially Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism, Its Birth and Dispersal*, Home University Library (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1934), pp. 70–82.

seemed to her to do justice to the positive side of the Buddhist path. Confronted at once by the negative anti-becoming formulae of later Singhalese monk-editors and by the impressions of Schopenhauer and other Western thinkers that the Buddha taught "negation of the will to live," Mrs. Rhys Davids felt a mission to publicize the great emphasis which she discovered in early Buddhist texts on spiritual growth, stirring up energy, "making-become" a desired state of mind, etc.

Her favorite tool in this connection was the unearthing of what she called "left-ins": fragments which betray an orientation clearly distinguishable from that of the later monastic editors, and which therefore may be presumed to be remnants of an "original gospel." This is a legitimate device, if properly used, familiar in the "quest of the historical Jesus." With its help, Mrs. Rhys Davids unearthed considerable evidence that the term "becoming" (*bhava*), later "blacklisted through the growing vogue of monkdom," had originally had a positive connotation. She adduced such terms as

> *bhabba*—"bound to become" (=Sanskrit *bhavya*) . . . somewhat parallel to the English-Christian idiom of a man who is "saved";
> *bhavasuddhi*—"salvation in (or of, or by) becoming."[23]

These "left-ins" carry weight because they are not merely isolated fragments, but can be correlated with such key parables as the Hen and the Chicks which stress the disciples' potential for spiritual breakthrough. Mrs. Rhys Davids' labors up to this point provided basic foundations for the recognition that, for Gotama, the self was a process. Even T.R.V. Murti, although he disagrees with Mrs. Rhys Davids' later revival of a Great Self, should acknowledge the debt to her pioneer efforts implicit in his conclusion: "The Real, for Buddhism, is Becoming."[24]

But "becoming" without someone who becomes did not satisfy her for long. Increasingly, as the one-time pioneer grew older, she felt that Gotama's stress on "will" (albeit without a word for it) seemed to call for a "willer," which she then proceeded to find in the Pāli texts by uncritically retranslating fragments out of context, translating reflexives as "The Self," and other arbitrary procedures. As this phase of her work has been demolished many

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[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 89–107. On pp. 99–100 she cites "bound to become" from *Majjhima-nikāya*, i.104, translated in Lord Chalmers, *Further Dialogues of the Buddha* (London: Humphrey Milford, 1926), Vol. I, p. 73, p. 257, etc.

Bhava-shudhi she cites on p. 100 from six of the Aśokan Edicts, references which she discusses in her *Sakya; or Buddhist Origins* (London: Kegan Paul, 1931), chap. XXIII.

[24] T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), p. 26. I am indebted to Miss I. B. Horner of the Pali Text Society, London, for calling my attention to this quotation.

times, it is not necessary to deal with it further here, except to stress the fact that the one-sided conclusions of her later years by no means invalidate the "left-in" method of "higher criticism" nor the importance of continuing to seek further light on her question: "What did Gotama really teach?" Rich treasures still await a more scholarly and careful examination of early strata of the documents, especially if combined with the kind of dialogue between Oriental studies and contemporary psychology in which Mrs. Rhys Davids pioneered.

Review Article

MYSTICISM AND MODERN PERSPECTIVE

WALTER HOUSTON CLARK

Garma C. C. Chang, trans. and ed. *The Hundred Thousand Songs of Milarepa.* 2 vols. New Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books, 1926. Pp. xvii + 730. $20.00.

W. T. Stace. *Mysticism and Philosophy.* Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1960. Pp. 349. $6.00.

W. T. Stace, ed. *The Teachings of the Mystics: Selections.* Mentor Books. New York: New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1960. Pp. 240. Paper, 50¢.

Alfred P. Stiernotte, ed. *Mysticism and the Modern Mind.* New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. Pp. xiv + 206.

D. T. Suzuki. *Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1957. Pp. xix + 214. $3.50. (Paper, Crowell-Collier, 1962.)

AFTER HAVING BEEN NEGLECTED and rejected for many years, presumably as something incompatible with the scientific age, the subject of mysticism has been enjoying a modest revival of interest in the last decade or so. The above titles are representative of many books on the subject published within recent years. Both scientists and philosophers seem to be coming to suspect that "there are more things in heaven and earth than have been dreamt of" in their philosophies, and so they have been willing to consider a somewhat wider range of phenomena than would have been possible not many years ago. The Enlightenment having banished mysticism, the Modern Age is now engaged in bringing it back.

Problems both for the philosopher and the religious scholar that arise from a serious consideration of mysticism can be grouped roughly about two contrasted themes. First of all there is the fact of the commonality of the experience. There are certain features that are the same wherever the phenomenon is found. There are problems of locating and describing identities, comparison, and communication. Then, paradoxically, there are the variety and multiplicity of the traditions by which mysticism is interpreted and explained, and from this observation different problems arise, such as the sources and explanation of this variety. This review article will first comment on the several volumes under review and then introduce briefly a psychological ap-

proach for the understanding of these problems and its bearing on the distinction of the East and West.

Perhaps the most significant book on mysticism to appear recently is *Mysticism and Philosophy*, by W. T. Stace, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. This volume is most helpful in describing the universal aspects of the phenomenon. Noting the importance of the tradition of mysticism, first in the East and then in the West, Stace has found it worth while to give systematic attention to the mystics in varying cultural contexts. As a result he has isolated the common characteristics of what he calls "the universal core" of profound mystical experiences as "(1) the Unitary Consciousness; the One, the Void; Pure Consciousness; (2) Nonspatial, nontemporal, (3) Sense of objectivity or reality, (4) Blessedness, peace, etc., (5) Feeling of the holy, sacred, or divine, (6) Paradoxicality, and (7) Alleged by mystics to be ineffable" (pp. 131–132). After having analyzed closely the consciousness of the mystics, so far as can be ascertained from their own subjective descriptions, Stace examines the implications for varying views of reality. Also, he distinguishes sharply between the essential experience, which is identical the world over, and the interpretations of it, which differ from faith to faith and from culture to culture.

Probably the subject of mysticism has never been considered with such clarity. In analyzing the phenomena, Stace approaches his subject naturalistically, and the results are of equal value to the philosopher and the psychologist. Of course, no philosopher is bound to Stace's conclusions about the essential nature of mysticism and the light it throws on reality, though it should be noted here that he is very persuasive in his preference for the pantheistic as opposed to the monistic or dualistic views.

What might be considered a companion volume to this book is the paperback of readings edited by Stace entitled *The Teachings of the Mystics.* One of the difficulties encountered by the average educated reader of the mystics is that, never having had a cogent mystical experience, he does not understand what the mystic is saying. After an initial act of admiration at the freshness and depth of the mystic's skill with words and figures of speech, he is apt to find the going becoming boring for the lack of hooks either in his mind or in his inner consciousness to which to attach the imagery of the writings. This is obviated by Stace in this book of readings in two ways: first, through his clear introduction to each group of selections, and, second, through the brevity of the selections.

Stace's two volumes, combined, constitute an excellent introduction for the scholar or the generally educated reader who wishes to acquaint him-

self with the phenomenon of mysticism in various traditions. As an aid to *Mysticism and Philosophy*, *The Teachings of the Mystics* suffers from the fact that, as in some of his other writings on mysticism, Stace does not precisely spell out his concept of the "universal core." Doubtless, though copyright is of the same year, *Mysticism and Philosophy* represents his ideas as more recently formulated.

The uninformed or provincial observer of the religious scene is not apt to look for mysticism among the liberals. For such, it will be instructive to look at *Mysticism and the Modern Mind*, edited by Alfred P. Stiernotte. This is a book of stimulating essays written by various liberal thinkers, including such well-known people as John Haynes Holmes and Henry Nelson Wieman. N. A. Nikam of India, the only non-Western philosopher included, in his article, "Mysticism in Indian Thought," relates Indian mysticism to Western tradition. On the whole, the essays are more even in their high quality than the contents of most symposia are apt to be. With the possible exception of Wieman's contribution, "The Problem of Mysticism," the clearest and most helpful essay seems to be the concluding commentary by the editor, whose cogent remarks entitled "Philosophical Implications" are enlightened with what appears to be some first-hand acquaintance with his material.

The Buddhist D. T. Suzuki further puts the West in his debt through his sympathetic understanding of Christianity in a characteristic book in Harper's World Perspective Series, *Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist.* Recognizing a familiar mystical note in the works of Meister Eckhart, he shows, in spite of the difference in idiom, the essential similarity of experience and insight between the medieval Christian mystic and Buddhist mysticism, particularly in its Zen tradition. The book thus confirms, in a way, Stace's contention that the experience of mysticism, at least psychologically, is similar the world over.

Chang's *The Hundred Thousand Songs of Milarepa* presents the life and teachings of a twelfth-century Tibetan saint, a work translated into English in full for the first time. The reader can contrast this Buddhist text with the Bible in its main concern to cultivate the mystic way, with righteousness as a by-product. The Judeo-Christian tradition tends to concentrate on righteousness, with mysticism clearly present but not expressly recognized and hence less often—particularly in modern times—deliberately cultivated. The Western reader of Milarepa is sometimes at a loss to distinguish profound religious teaching from mere folklore, but there is no doubt of the high quality of many of the songs. Like Stace's readings, Chang's *The Hundred Thousand Songs* documents for the student of mysticism the generalizations made in other volumes and enables him to test them.

Both Stace and Suzuki confirm other authorities in the feeling that in the mystical consciousness we are confronted with a human experience that is universal in nature. It not only occurs under the most varied conditions of culture and faith commitment, but also occasionally in cases of no commitment. Stace includes in his readings a selection from Arthur Koestler recounting a mystical experience when he was a communist and therefore committed to atheism. Consequently, it would seem that, if we are to explain mysticism and its function, an important consideration would be a psychological one.

In his contribution to Stiernotte's volume, Wieman throws some light on this psychological function. He alludes to Karl Jaspers' account of how we meet existential problems like death, guilt, loneliness, and chance disaster (pp. 35 f.). This includes (1) keeping the problems largely out of consciousness—the most common and popular way; (2) confronting them but reacting with despair and nausea—the way of Camus and Sartre; or (3) by what Jaspers calls "a change in our consciousness of being"—which Wieman takes to be the mystical way, or "rebirth."

While a mystical experience in itself would seem to be no guarantee of a beneficial change in personality and behavior, there is no doubt that in certain individuals other favoring factors combine with the mystical experience to accomplish results obtainable in no other way. Aldous Huxley calls the mystical way the one effective method for "the radical and permanent transformation of personality."[1] For example, in the case of Koestler, his mystical experience set in motion an inner process that changed his goals and led him to withdraw from the communist movement within two years. Again, in the case of Teresa of Ā'vila, her mystical vision at the age of 42 transformed an ineffective neurotic into one of the most vigorous and competent Catholic leaders of her generation. It seems that it is the expansion of vision, the amazingly potent and fresh view of reality, as it appears to the mystic, that adds a new dimension to life both humbles the visionary and at the same time exalts him, and makes possible those personality changes that are so unique.

When we seek help from the modern psychologist as to just what it is of which mystical experience consists, or even how to describe it, we are apt to find that he cannot tell us, and, quite likely, that, like Gallio, he cares for "none of these things." But the medieval Eckhart may help in distinguishing "three kinds of knowledge," the experience of sense, the exercise of reason, and, finally, the "exalted power of the soul, a power so high and noble

[1]Aldous Huxley, *Grey Eminence* (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), p. 306.

it is able to see God face to face in his own self" (Suzuki, pp. 53–54). We know how remote from the life of sense the life of reason is. If we can imagine the release and exultation that would come to a creature of pure sense from its first exercise of reason, then in the same manner those of us who have never experienced the mystical vision can imagine our own insufficiency and blindness in the presence of those who have unlocked within themselves their mystical potentialities.

The question then presents itself as to what we are going to do with the mystical consciousness as a source of knowledge. The mystic reports his experience as a supreme source of knowledge, more cogent and convincing than the experience either of sense or of reason. In comparison, the latter may seem to pale into insignificance. To the skeptic, who objects that the experience of sense and reason can be verified publicly, the mystic may retort that his experience, too, may be verified—by another mystic. Also, he can say that everyone has mystical potentiality if he is only willing to develop it properly. Certainly mystics seem to have a sense for one another and find it easier to communicate among themselves than with non-mystics. This suggests, at least, a limited commonality of experience rather than quixotic abnormality. When one adds to this the frequent access of strength and capacity that often follows on the mystical vision, or the experience of "rebirth" that often seems to lift the individual to a higher plane, certainly it is appropriate to raise the question whether the mystic is not in contact with a more intense and satisfying order of reality wherein it is the unity rather than the distinction of man and Nature that is the impressive feature.

The question then arises concerning the source of diversity in faith commitments, if the psychological universality of the essential core of mystical experience is granted. As we have seen, Stace makes a clear distinction between mysticism's psychological core and its interpretation. The former is universal; the latter varies from tradition to tradition. If it should seem strange that a common psychological experience is so variously interpreted, we need only remind ourselves that interpretations derive from the rational or more analytical layer of consciousness rather than the mystical, which tends to perceive wholes. The theologian is not necessarily a mystic. The less he is, the more his rational explanations may be expected to diverge from the core experience in which the mystical root of spiritual life is to be found. Also, the theologian is serving other, less spiritual functions as well. One of these is to perpetuate the religious institution, for which dogma and creed are useful. Here there is a need for a high degree of differentiation from other religious institutions and faith commitments. If it should be suspected among

the faithful that all faiths are the same under the skin, an embarrassing tolerance of non-believers would weaken that close in-group feeling that arises from the sense that the truth has been divinely committed to one's own group.

This means that there is a certain premium to be gained through idiosyncrasy which serves not only the individual's need for ego-inflation but particularly his faith group. Should he consider apostasy, it can punish him both through ostracism and by giving him the inward sense that he has abandoned truth. Thus it will be seen that, when faced with competition, faith groups have a tendency to emphasize the peripheral aspects of their belief—in other words, that which distinguishes them. For this purpose, what is absurd will serve better than what is sensible, for outsiders are not so likely to espouse it. Certainly there could be nothing more institutionally disturbing than the inner conviction, as opposed to the mere statement, that all men are truly one. This is one reason the mystic and the priest in all ages have tended to misunderstand one another. A little too influential to be abused during his life, Eckhart's bones were dug up after his death and scattered abroad in punishment for too plainly speaking out of his own vital experience.

Thus we can see that the distinction between East and West is partly psychological in nature. The prevailing psychological mode in the West is rational. This has paid great dividends for the West in the form of science, technology, and the consequent power and influence that have gone along with them. This has meant that mystics have always been forced in some degree to swim against the stream of opinion in the West as heretics, visionaries, or otherwise peculiar people. Religious emphases have centered on ethical conduct, theology, creeds, and dogma. In the East the mystic has more often held an honored position, and this pre-eminence has conditioned all of Eastern culture. Thus the mystical or "aesthetic" mode, as F.S.C. Northrop prefers to call it, seems to predominate in some aspects of the culture of the East. This is to be seen to a certain degree when one compares *The One Hundred Thousand Songs of Milarepa* with Western scriptures. The former is composed very largely of poetry, in which are many warnings against analysis, words, and reason. Righteousness, Milarepa holds, as has been said, is not so much the immediate goal of the holy man as it is a by-product of enlightenment.

The fact that in the West the mystics have tended to oppose authority and have produced creative works tempts one to characterize the mystic as a creative, "frontier" personality and the rationalist as a conservative. Certainly the rationalist is on much safer ground in the West. The workings of his mind

can be followed in a more or less public way, and he is apt to receive acclaim, particularly if he moves in the general direction of which the public approves. But this is an over-simplification, for there are rationalists who are adventurous and creative with ideas as well as with their applications. The West has been extremely creative and influential, but along the lines where rationality has dominated development, as in concepts, science, technology, and emphasis on the intellectual approach to ethics, however far away the actuality might be.

At the same time, one can point to much in the way of stagnation in the East, where the passivity necessary for mystical contemplation has often been turned into the passivity of laziness and neglect. Often a mere appearance of mysticism has taken the place of the genuine experience. Though the East has been amazingly fertile and creative in some directions, as with Oriental art and religion, it has been conservative as well. A mystical cultural orientation is not an automatic guarantee of progress, in every direction, or regression, either.

But we may note that to the psychologist one difference between East and West to some degree appears to be a psychological one. The difference in this respect is between the person who lives by his reason and him who is guided more by his intuitive and poetic sense. Each of these roads to knowledge has its characteristic strengths and weaknesses. Neither is one incompatible with the other, for great men operate in both modes. E. T. Buehrer, in his perceptive article in the Stiernotte volume, "Mysticism and A. N. Whitehead," speaks not only of the combination of rationalism and mysticism in the thought of Whitehead, but reminds us of others, such as Einstein, Schweitzer, and Pascal, whose keenness of reason has not kept them from a lively sense of the mystical as well. It is hard to say whether there is something constitutional which inclines a person toward the rational or toward the mystical—or whether it is the expectation of the culture that determines one's psychological preference.

Certainly, though much has been left unsaid, enough has been said to indicate that, following the lead of the volumes under review, it is time that the subject of mysticism, both in its psychological and in its philosophical aspects, in art and also religion, receive the attention it deserves. Only if the balance is redressed in this direction can we gain the wisdom that is needed if philosophy, psychology, and religion are to make their full contribution to the solving of the great problems of the age.

Note

*THE UNDIFFERENTIATED AESTHETIC CONTINUUM**

F. S. C. NORTHROP

WHAT IS THE EMPIRICAL or other evidence for believing that the Buddhist-Hindu self, in which *Brahman* and *Ātman* are one, exists and is such that its existence is confirmable empirically by anyone anywhere who will take the trouble to do so. Unless such evidence can be provided, or operational ways for finding it can be given, the scientific warrant for this belief will not become evident to modern minds.

This evidence is well known to those who have been brought up in traditional Indian culture, where the psychological operations of meditation, *yoga*, etc., have been practiced, in which one eliminates all the relativistic differentiations of sensing and introspecting from one's all-embracing, radically empirical experience, to be left with the undifferentiated *Ātman*-that-is-*Brahman* without a difference, which, like the pool embracing its transitory waves, is identical not merely in all persons but also is the divine consciousness.

Because Western scientists, philosophers, and religious people are accustomed to think only about facts in experience and knowledge which are differentiated, and hence determinate, factors that are this rather than that, it is, in the writer's judgment, impossible, or at least unnecessarily difficult, to convey to Westerners the empirical evidence for this Buddhist-Hindu concept of any person's self in terms of Buddhist and Hindu philosophy, whether Westerners read this philosophy in the original Sanskrit and Pali or in translation or whether they listen to expert Asian scholars' expositions of it. What happens again and again when Westerners try to understand *Nirvāṇa* or the *Ātman*-that-is-*Brahman* is that, because it has never occurred to them that anything undifferentiated exists and can be real, they always read into *Nirvāṇa*, *Ātman*, and *Brahman* Western determinate concepts of reality, conscious personality, and the religious object.

*As selected by the Editor from the paper, "The Philosophical Roots and Validity of Tagore's Genius," by F. S. C. Northrop in Ram Jee Singh, ed., *D. M. Datta Commemorative Volume* (Bharati Bhawan).

At this point it may well be asked: But you are a Westerner. How, then, can you have your apparent confidence that you understand the Buddhist and Hindu concept of the self? The answer is that I would not if I depended on any of the foregoing methods to determine what it means. The fact is that in analyzing the theories of recent mathematical physics I found myself wrestling with the problem of relating (a) its imageless, theoretically known, unobservable and inexperienceable, mathematically constructed scientific objects and their laws to (b) the concrete differentiated data of radically empirical immediate conscious experience, so that both were accounted for with the minimum number of elementary assumptions. For reasons which are to be found in greater detail in the last chapter of the writer's *Science and First Principles*,[1] it became evident that, if one is not to be left with as many elementary concepts in one's philosophical analysis of recent mathematical physics as there are different sense qualities relative to different people over the whole of human history, thereby creating a philosophical beard so prodigious that even an Occam's razor powered by atomic energy could not shave it, it is necessary to assume something immediately experienced, all-embracing, psychical, and undifferentiated. With such an elemental, purely existentially experienced factor taken as primitive, together with one mathematically constructed concept by postulation that is the physicist's field equation taken also as primitive, the countless sensed, introspected differentiations relative to particular percipients and occasions can be derived as defined concepts. With only these two primitives, the elemental assumptions are not multiplied beyond necessity and Occam's principle is not violated.

The problem then became that of finding a way to express this primitive, radically empirical factor. Note again its characteristics. It is conscious, immediately experienced, undifferentiated, embracing both the transitory relative, differentiated knower and the differentiated objects of knowledge, identical in both subject and object and yet the spontaneously creative source of all the differentiated *esse est percipi* qualities that come and go as phenomenal appearances within it. Little did the writer realize at the time that ancient Asian philosophers had attempted to use determinate words referring to differentiated factors of experience to express the undifferentiated and had given up trying to do so, realizing that, strictly speaking, it cannot be done.

There is another reason for the belief that understanding of the mean-

[1] (New York: The Macmillan Company; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931).

ing of the Buddhist-Hindu concept of the person cannot be conveyed to Westerners by the use of the Buddhist-Hindu texts in either the original or translation or by the commentaries of Asian experts on those texts. Even the texts themselves tell us that they are useless to this end. When asked by his pupil what the word "*Brahman*" means, the *guru*, who knows, bats the question back to the pupil, asking him to state what he thinks it means, knowing full well that, whatever the reply, it will be wrong and will have to be answered with the words "*Neti! Neti!*"—it is not this, nor any other determinate that. Paradoxically, in such a reply the *guru* had answered the pupil's original question, the point being that *Brahman* is undifferentiated and hence cannot be described in determinate language.

Not knowing in the 1920s of these experiences of my ancient Asian Buddhist and Hindu predecessors, I proceeded to try to solve the problem of describing the indescribable. My first result, which appears in the aforementioned chapter of *Science and First Principles*, attempted to describe this primitive factor as "bare indeterminate experienced quality." When Whitehead read this with much interest, he said that the word "*quale*" would be better, since quality is a determinate entity. Then it became evident that the expression "bare, indeterminate experienced quality" was self-contradictory, since to predicate indeterminateness of a determinate quality is to affirm a contradiction. Clearly, this expression would not do. Nor did "*quale*" seem satisfactory, since even it suggested too much the atomic and locally provincial.

During this same period, the following question occurred of a sudden to the writer: Isn't the undifferentiated factor in concrete experience and human consciousness, which I am trying futilely to describe, precisely what the Buddhist philosophers mean by "*Nirvāṇa*" and the Hindus by the "*Ātman*-that-is-*Brahman*" without a difference? It was with this question in mind and with the hope of getting an answer to it that I went to the first East-West Philosophers' Conference in Honolulu in 1939.

By then it had become evident to me that an expression had to be found which would not describe this fact in anybody's conscious experience but point to where it is to be found, since only experiencing it can give it. Reacting from the localized atomicity of the word "quality" and even its less determinate form "*quale,*" I selected the word "continuum." This gave expression to the all-embracing character, the *Brahman* cosmical nature of this elemental factor in anyone's experience. But the word "continuum" in mathematical physics has a determinate, axiomatically constructed concept-by-postulation meaning. Hence, the word "continuum" by itself would not

do, if it is not to mislead Westerners, since the *Brahman* without differences is not a mathematically constructed, theoretically known entity. Instead, it is immediate experience with all differentiations of sensing and sensa removed, signifying nothing beyond itself. What adjective best distinguishes the all-embracing, radically empirical continuum of immediacy with all sensing and sensed differentia eliminated? At this point the word "aesthetic" suggested itself, since art does not talk about its subject matter but shows it denotatively and existentially as immediately experienced. Even so, this use of the adjective "aesthetic" is misleading unless it is taken, as the writer specified, in the *radically immediate* sense of impressionistic art, or "art in its first function," rather than of "art in its second function,"[2] which signifies some doctrinally inferred or mathematically conceived *logos* that transcends radically existential immediacy.

But the continuum of impressionistic, immediately experienced aesthetic immediacy is, except at its periphery, usually differentiated, whereas the primitive factor necessary to clarify the relation between the mathematical constructs of mathematical physics and the concrete data of experience, without growing a prodigious philosophical beard, is this aesthetic continuum of immediacy without the differentiations which sensing and sensa exhibit. The adjective "undifferentiated" added to the words "aesthetic continuum" seemed, therefore, to suffice to point the Western reader to the factor in question, and to prevent anyone from supposing that it is an object of sense awareness, since both sensing and the objects of the senses are differentiated.

These autobiographical experiences have been given here to one end. They suggest that the Buddhist-Hindu unqualifiedly non-dualistic and Vedāntic concept of the person is empirically verifiable by anyone anywhere in at least the following three ways: (1) By the Asian operational techniques of meditation and *yoga*, in which all differentiations are removed from radically empirical experience. (2) By William James's observation that radically empirical experience is an all-embracing continuum which is undifferentiated at its periphery and transitorily differentiated only at what he called "the focus of attention." It may well be the case also that (3) the imageless determinate mathematical constructs of contemporary mathematical physics, for which the writer at the 1939 East-West Philosophers' Conference used the words "concepts by postulation"[3] to distinguish them

[2]For the distinction between these two species of art, see F. S. C. Northrop, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947; also New York: Meridian Paperback, 1959), chap. IX.

[3]See Charles A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy—East and West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), chap. VIII.

from naïve realistic hypotheses, can be made understandable in their epistemic correlation with, and predictive power concerning, the differentiated data of concrete empirical experience by taking as one of the two primitives in one's scientific theory and philosophy what the Buddha named *Nirvāṇa*, the unqualifiedly non-dualistic Hindu refers to as the "self-without-differences," in which *Ātman* and *Brahman* are one, and the writer called "the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum."

Communication

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA CENTENARY

On January 17, 1963, India inaugurated on a national scale the Centenary Celebration of Swami Vivekananda. The Swami is regarded as one of India's foremost nation-builders; his teachings influenced the thinking of other national leaders, like Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Subhas Chandra Bose. The occasion was also observed in other parts of the world, especially in America, where the Swami has many devoted followers. His first direct contact with the West was through the Parliament of Religions held in Chicago in 1893 in connection with the Columbian Exposition. He worked in America for four years and impressed many leaders and the public by his wide range of knowledge, his eloquence, and his warm heart and personal integrity. It may be said that Swami Vivekananda was the first cultural ambassador of India to the New World.

Swami Vivekananda was born in an aristocratic family of Calcutta in 1863. His parents influenced the Swami's thinking: the father by his rational mind and the mother by her religious temperament. During his early years he became familiar with Western philosophy and science, and refused to accept anything without rational proof and pragmatic test. But another part of his mind was drawn to the spiritual ideals of meditation and non-attachment. While searching for a man who could directly demonstrate the reality of God, he came to Sri Ramakrishna (1836–1886) at the age of nineteen and was attracted by his saintliness. But he smiled at the saint's ecstasies and visions as mere figments of imagination. Gradually he became Ramakrishna's disciple. The latter, however, never asked him to give up his rational approach. One of the striking instructions Ramakrishna gave him was to forego his eagerness "to see God with eyes closed" but, rather, to see Him "with eyes open." Vivekananda was taught that service to men was the most effective worship of God.

Following Ramakrishna's death, Vivekananda became a religious mendicant and traveled all over India, mixing with all types of people, high and low, educated and ignorant. He was deeply distressed at the sight of the material degradation of the masses. Exploited by the selfish rich and by greedy priests, they had become victims of hunger, ignorance, and ill-health. He quickly realized that spirituality was not responsible for their sad plight, but, rather, what was preached in its name. He remembered the admonition of Sri Ramakrishna and resolved to dedicate himself to the uplift of India's common men and at the same time to remind them of their rich spiritual heritage, embodied in the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavad-gītā.*

The Swami's keen mind found out that what India needed most was science and technology as developed in the West during the past three hundred years. These would give her the basic needs of life. That was the compelling motive of his coming to America. He also wanted to share with the American people certain spiritual truths cherished in India which he thought might help the West to overcome its anxieties and restlessness. His mission was both national and international.

In America he tried to remove many mistaken notions held by Westerners regarding Indian culture. He also presented in simple but forceful language the philosophy of non-dualistic Vedānta, which he regarded as the loftiest height of Hindu philosophical speculation. Through his speeches, writings, and personal contacts he stressed the concepts of the divinity of the soul, the oneness of existence, the solidarity of mankind, and the harmony of religions. He reminded Americans that these concepts would supply them with a spiritual basis for democracy, human rights, and ethical laws, and put an end to religious quarrels. In his opinion, the concept of a non-dualistic ultimate reality, or *Brahman*, which as pure spirit permeates the whole creation, was free from dissension and conflict, and was conducive to the welfare of all. The Swami taught that non-dualism never repudiated the world and the individual but gave them spiritual status. The ultimate experience of a non-dualist was not the realization of the universe as *māyā*, but as the expression of pure spirit. A man's actions and thoughts should be guided by the principles of the divinity of the soul and the solidarity of mankind.

Swami Vivekananda's philosophical acumen was admired by such scholars and philosophers as William James, Josiah Royce, C. C. Everett (Dean of the Harvard School of Divinity), Robert Ingersoll, Nikola Tesla, Lord Kelvin, and Professor Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von Helmholtz. They freely exchanged ideas with him.

Swami Vivekananda returned to India in 1897, but took with him neither money nor knowledge about science and technology. The political condition of India was not propitious for exchange of scholarship or for foreign aid on a vast scale. But since 1947, when India attained independence, the Swami's dream is being fulfilled. Meaningful steps are being taken in various directions to create mutual understanding and respect between East and West. The Swami died at the age of thirty-nine, after establishing the Ramakrishna Order, whose members take vows to dedicate themselves to knowledge of truth and service to humanity. He exhorted Indians to apply the truths of Vedānta philosophy to everyday life. Since his death, Vedānta centers have been established in various parts of the world, including a dozen in America.

Swami Vivekananda's writings, speeches, letters, and poems, published in eight volumes, show the vastness and depth of his knowledge, both Eastern and Western. His *Raja-Yoga* is based on the philosophy of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga; *Bhakti-yoga* deals with the philosophy of the love of God; *Karma-yoga* summarizes the teachings of the *Bhagavad-gītā*; and *Jñāna-yoga* explains the philosophy of non-dualistic Vedānta. He tried to reconcile the various schools of Hindu philosophy on the basis of non-dualism. In his opinion, the different branches of knowledge were complementary and not contradictory.

Swami Vivekananda founded the Advaita Ashrama at Mayavati in the Himalayas, where neither inmates nor guests are permitted any formal worship. He wanted to bring students there from all cultural traditions to study philosophy on a non-partisan basis and to devote themselves to contemplation. The Home of Service, which he founded in Banaras, carries on medical relief work. He aimed at turning the Belur Math, the Headquarters of the Ramakrishna Order near Calcutta, into a complete university where Western science and Eastern mysticism would be studied side-by-side.

Swami Vivekananda felt an imperative need of understanding between East and West. Neither of them, in spite of their great achievements in the spiritual and physical realms, has solved all of its own vital problems, much less the world problem.

Intellect without vision, reason without compassion—and vice versa—could spell a great human tragedy. In this "one world," man can no longer live an isolated existence. We are all living in a sea of thoughts in which are floating the mystical experiences of the seers, the exhortations of religious prophets, the speculations of philosophers, the organized knowledge of the physical sciences, and the mature imaginings of the world's poets and artists. Swami Vivekananda envisioned a Parliament of Man in which all these scattered ideas would be collated to correct the imbalance in the present human situation in both East and West.

—Prepared by Swami Nikhilananda

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

THE SUFIS

by

Idries Shah

Grand Sheikh of the Sufis

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For the first time, an authority on mystical and occult philosophy explores the bases of the secret heritage which has had enormous, yet almost unrecognized, influence on both the East and the West . . . the way of life whose followers believe is not *a* religion but *all* religion . . . the mystical teaching which can be traced in the work of many diverse writers, from Aesop and Omar Khayyam to Chaucer, Dante and St. John of the Cross. "Eminently readable . . . a useful introduction to a subject that is still too little known." — ROBERT PAYNE, *N. Y. Times Book Review*. $5.95 at all booksellers or from the publishers, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, N. Y.



DOUBLEDAY

Book Reviews

Books reviewed here are limited to those in the field of Oriental and comparative philosophy. Authors and publishers are encouraged to send review copies of appropriate books to the Editor.

AXIONOETICS. By *A. G. Javadekar.* Bombay, New Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, London, New York: Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1963. Pp. 182.

"Axionoetics" is "a valuational study of human experiences in general and intellectual acquisitions in particular," according to the author, who is Head of the Department of Philosophy at the Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda. But, though it is clear that we are to view knowledge in terms of value, it never becomes clear how we are to carry out that program. As a result, though suggestive and in many ways original, this book remains an invitation to philosophize rather than a philosophical contribution of the first order.

The thesis most on Javadekar's mind is that the worth of a piece of knowledge is dependent upon the moral and spiritual worth of the knower. For example, the successful scientist cultivates his intellect by discipline: "hard labour, sincerity, impartiality, even a sort of moral asceticism are essential . . ." (p. 58). We need to assess, not the *pramāṇas* (the means of knowing), but the *pramātṛ* (the knowing agent). It is, after all, persons who are free to improve and create, and we need to know the conditions of the powers of growth and spontaneity. However, Javadekar fails to defend this position against the most obvious retort, which is that moral and spiritual growth depends in turn on knowledge, however attained. One may submit that sinful knowledge accumulated by evil men may provide subsequent generations with the necessary information for self-improvement. If this is true, we may be pardoned for seeking criteria of knowledge and truth independent of the worth of the knower or the asserting subject.

One of the difficulties in this book stems from its author's background in Advaita Vedānta, which appears to have led him to address himself to topics which are, given the main thrust of his thesis, not the most germane to it. Such topics as the issues over the self-validity of knowledge (Chapter III), the *catuṣkoṭi* (Chapter IX), and the harmonization of truth, beauty, and goodness (Chapter XII), though appropriate in discussing Advaita, do not seem well-linked to the main contentions of axionoetics.

Stemming from the same source, perhaps, is the frequency of his disclaimers of certain positions with which in fact his thesis shares marked similarities. An outstanding case is pragmatism, which Javadekar rejects because he thinks (wrongly) that its view of value is utilitarian in the restrictive sense of the term. However, of all Western philosophies now current it is pragmatism that is most insistent on the role of human selectivity in knowing; it is pragmatism which may most easily agree that "there is no wisdom without valuational discrimination" (p. 167). Javadekar fails to

put this similarity to account because he is committed to certain dogmas which were intended to elevate Advaita above the other systems of Indian thought, and because he implicitly equates pragmatism, positivism, and logical empiricism with Cārvāka, Buddhist, Jaina, and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views.

And yet it is precisely Javadekar's willingness to be critical of Advaita doctrine while attempting to remain in some fashion within the fold that is perhaps the most original aspect of his approach. After all, in the broad fashion discussed above, all Indian philosophers were pragmatists, but only a few were Advaitins. What Javadekar does is to eliminate the unfashionable absolute idealist epistemology of classical Advaitins by subordinating it to concerns of "value." One only wishes it were clearer from his account what "value" means to him. We never hear from him which theory of value he holds. Perhaps he wants to hold all systems of value at once (cf. Chapter XI, especially p. 152).

Despite these failings, this is an important book. It serves notice that Indian philosophers can try to address themselves to philosophical problems in a fashion based in classical Indian thought and yet suggestive for contemporary times. We have had very few such works recently. Let us hope that we have more in the future.

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NEW FRONTIERS IN EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION. By *Ratna Navaratnam.* Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1958. Pp. xviii + 155

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION. By *Humayun Kabir.* Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961. Pp. viii + 256

The title of Mrs. Navaratnam's little book is misleading. On the first page of Chapter I she states her thesis: "The search for the universal constants in Education opens new frontiers in educational philosophy that bring into sight the hitherto neglected partnership of East and West in their joint quest for certainty."

Certainly no one gainsays the need for Eastern and Western thinkers to explore common—and other—problems together. No one denies the possibility and the desirability of each learning much from the other. But to predicate such a search upon a presumed "joint quest for certainty" is to guarantee defeat at the outset. American educational philosophers by an overwhelming majority, along with increasing numbers of educational thinkers in non-communist Europe, have abjured "the quest for certainty," adopting the position set forth by John Dewey in a book published in 1929 and using this phrase for its title.

Unfortunately, the author does little to "bring into sight" any partnership of East and West, even with the decreasing minority of Western educational thinkers who are still engaged in "the quest for certainty." Educational philosophy is not a discrete field; it is neither more nor less than the application of philosophic method to educational problems. A treatment which does not, even by implication, deal with either ontology or epistemology, and which approaches axiology only by means of glittering generalizations, holds little promise of promoting fruitful dialogue.

In the more interesting portions of the book, "The Testimony of the East" and "The Testament of the West," Mrs. Navaratnam presents rather charming little vignettes of Hinduism, Buddhism, Platonism, and Scholasticism. Many readers, however, will find her descriptions sentimental, and her determination to equate the values of these systems tortured and unconvincing.

In three chapters, the author undertakes to assess "The Dynamics of Secular Humanism in the West." Her understanding of Dewey, to whom she devotes a chapter, appears to be superficial; but one wonders that a writer whose concern is with the "universality of truth," and who feels called upon to capitalize Mind can find as many gentle little generalized compliments to pay as she does.

Mrs. Navaratnam eventually gets down to cases with brief descriptions of Gandhi's basic education and Tagore's experimental school at Santiniketan.

The author concludes, in her penultimate chapter: "Our survey of the eastern and western philosophies of education has led us to find a basis for unity at a time of crisis in the march of humanity in an Education of Reality which affirmed the Reality of the Child. Our objective was centered in the rediscovery of the integrity of man and on the primacy of the spiritual." This assertion is necessary, for there is little in "our survey" itself which would lead the reader to any such conclusion.

Mrs. Navaratnam's effort to establish identities in the "educational philosophies" of East and West is, of course, fruitless. The pity of it is that it is also needless. The basis for joint effort and the glory of Gandhi's and Tagore's experiments lie not in unity, or even in integration of outlook, but in recognition of the principle enunciated by Jacques Maritain:

". . . the only solution is of the *pluralistic* type. Men belonging to most different philosophical or religious creeds and families could and should cooperate in the common welfare of the earthly community, provided they similarly assent to the basic tenets of a society of free men. . . . Thus it is that men possessing quite different, even opposite, metaphysical or religious outlooks—materialists, idealists, agnostics, Christians and Jews, Moslems and Buddhists—can converge *not by virtue of any identity of doctrine, but by virtue of an analogical similitude in practical principles,* toward the same practical conclusions, and can share in the same practical democratic philosophy, provided that they similarly revere, *perhaps for quite diverse reasons,* truth and intelligence, human dignity, freedom, brotherly love, and the absolute value of moral good."[1]

Professor Kabir's book also has a misleading title—but the selection of a title for a book composed almost wholly of convocation addresses is a tricky business. The first two lectures, delivered at Oxford, might be designated "position papers," in which the author sets forth his conception of the role of higher education and of the relation between education and society.

The remaining lectures, all commencement addresses delivered to graduating classes at various universities in India, deal generally with the theme of education and national development or national unity. Kabir is a master of style, and his speeches read easily. There is surprisingly little repetition, considering the similarity of the occasions for the lectures. In each lecture, Kabir drives home a point. He speaks both clearly and plainly. The careful reader can deduce a great deal about the problems of Indian education and the concomitant problems of national development from these lectures.

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[1]*Nation*, Vol. 160, No. 16, April 21, 1945.

THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION: A NEW APPROACH TO THE RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS OF MANKIND. By *Wilfred Cantwell Smith.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962. Pp. viii + 340. $7.00.

Professor Smith, who was formerly Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University and is now Director of the Center for the Study of World Religions at Harvard, presents in his book these three main theses:

1) Although religious faith and religious practices are found among peoples of virtually every age and locale, most peoples up to quite recent times have lacked both the general concept of religion and also the concepts of particular religions, such as Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, etc.

2) The general concept of religion and the concepts of particular religions are befuddling to the scholar.

3) They are also offensive to the believer.

The conclusion that Smith wishes to draw from these three theses is this recommendation: We ought to dispense with talk of religion and religions and substitute talk of cumulative (religious) traditions and personal faith.

Thesis 1 might be taken to support a rather different conclusion, viz., that only in recent times have men begun to develop the conceptual apparatus necessary to a proper understanding of the variegated religious life of mankind. To make thesis 1 support his own conclusion rather than the alternative here suggested Smith seems to be counting on the assumption that concepts that do not belong to the natural history of a people's religious life will for that reason not be helpful in the study of that life. But that assumption is highly questionable. To be sure, it is an interesting and important fact about, say, Buddhists that very few of them would think of themselves as adherents of a religion—would even know what that means. (Incidentally, it is also an interesting fact about the nineteenth century that the names for Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, etc., were made up in that century.) But this fact about Buddhists does not tend to show that Buddhism is no religion, any more than showing that a primitive tribe has no general concept of a taboo shows that that tribe has no taboos. Many concepts that we use to understand life in other societies and in other times are not concepts that the people being studied share. If that fact alone convicted our studies of distortion, then historians, sociologists, and anthropologists would be pretty much defeated before beginning.

Despite the fact that thesis 1 does very little to support Smith's conclusion, it is in itself an interesting and significant proposition. The rich and full way in which Smith documents it (the book's footnotes run to 130 pages) seems to constitute the major importance of his study.

Smith supports thesis 2 by direct appeal to scholarly authorities and by giving evidence of a tendency toward nominalism in recent scholarship. But his main defense of thesis 2 seems to rest upon a more or less philosophical analysis of what happened when people first began to talk about religions and religion. What happened, he says, is that they reified what are not really things. One reason Smith gives for denying

that religion and religions are things is that there is no essence which the religious faith and practices of all men have in common. Presupposed here is the Platonic argument that if x is an F and y is an F there must something, F-ness, which x and y have in common by virtue of which they are both properly said to be Fs. In our day, Wittgenstein has argued persuasively that we may properly say x is an F and y is an F, even though there is no essence, F-ness, which they share; for it may be that w, x, y, and z belong to a "family" linked by "family resemblances," without there being a single essence common to them all. Wittgenstein invites us to consider the family resemblances among games—board games, card games, ball games, team games, games for two, for one, etc. (*Philosophical Investigations* 66 ff.). With games, as with religions, it is important to keep in mind the tremendous variety of things called by the same name and not become obsessed with the Platonic question as to what is the single essence that they all have in common.

That leaves us with the contention that the concept of religion and the concepts of particular religions are offensive to the believer—thesis 3. No doubt this is true. "The participant is concerned with God; the observer has been concerned with 'religion'" (p. 131). Perhaps there is, as Smith suggests, a decline in personal faith corresponding to a willingness to view one's own faith and religious practice as belonging to one religion among others. But we are here onto a basic problem about reconciling religious faith and personal commitment with objectivity and scholarly detachment. It is not at all clear how a more nominalistic and a less rationalistic approach to the comparative study of religious faith and practice will be of much help in solving or dissolving that problem.

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A STUDY OF GOOD. By *Kitarō Nishida.* Translated by *V. H. Viglielmo*, Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Japanese Government, 1960. Pp. vi + 217. [Included within these pages: "How to Read Nishida" by Daisetz T. Suzuki (pp. iii–vi) and "Nishida Kitaro and Some Aspects of his Philosophical Thought" by Toraturo Shinomura (pp. 191–217).]

This work is the third in a series of philosophical publications issued by the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO in keeping with the UNESCO resolution of 1956 to advance the "mutual appreciation of Eastern and Western cultural values." This translation of Nishida's *Zen no kenkyū*, first published in 1911, is to be welcomed, if on no other ground, for making available in English an influential work in the history of modern Japanese thought, and a germinal work in the history of Nishida's own philosophical development. It is equally fortunate to have the work presented in a careful and readable translation.[1]

In selecting *A Study of Good* for translation, the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO no doubt had in mind the purpose of offering to the English-reading

[1]Professor Matao Noda of Kyoto University compared the English translation with the Japanese text in detail, and found it, in general, a faithful translation.

world a work which would afford special insight into ideas peculiar to the Japanese tradition. *A Study of Good* serves this purpose well, although it will not thereby recommend itself as philosophy to a large number of Western philosophers.

The work sketches a total metaphysics in which the discussion of ethics and the good is set. Nishida first of all develops a doctrine of "pure experience." Referring explicitly to James, he takes the "immediate flux of life" to be the object of direct awareness, and argues that all categorial distinctions are derivative and secondary to the immediately known. Unlike James, however, Nishida identifies "true reality" and pure experience. To know this order of being is to "immerse" oneself in it.

Nevertheless, Nishida has a great deal to say discursively about the "real." His acquaintance with Western philosophy was extensive, and his use of it in defending his doctrine of pure experience is to select or reject ideas as more or less approximating our immediate sense of the real. For example, Nishida finds in the tendency of thought to organize or unify phenomena under a law or through a system of explanation a reflection of the underlying unity of pure experience. Likewise, the distinction between subject and object lacks any ultimate ontological justification in the light of our immediate sense of the unity of pure experience. The attractions for Nishida of James's "radical empiricism" and of aspects of Hume's phenomenalism can be understood in this light. In general, the tendency of Western thinkers, especially among the post-Kantians, to base metaphysics on a "description"of the immediate knowledge of the self and its states affords Nishida many suggestions for his conception of the real.

The force and persuasiveness of Nishida's doctrine of "pure experience," both in his own time and among his followers today, derives from its Buddhistic background in Japanese thought. The commitment to an intuited reality beyond the order of conscious, discriminated experience is the basis of this appeal. The noumenal realm of "pure experience" is a "nothing" which is at one and the same time, like a Plotinian "One," everything.

In his discussion of ethics and the good, Nishida turns, as he does in metaphysics, to a study of Western ethical theories. Heteronomous theories fail because they offer no reason why we should perform the good. According to Nishida, they require blind obedience, since they derive from a source extraneous to human nature. Intuitive theories, insofar as they maintain that a judgment of what to do in a given situation is self-evident, fail, for one thing, to explain how, at a latter date, the same judgment may be reversed. Autonomous theories of ethics, in which Nishida's theory falls, are of three kinds: reason as a basis of ethics, pleasure as its basis, and will as its basis. Rational ethics fails because, "Even if we have been able to know the true aspects of things intellectually, we are unable to know from this what is the good" (p. 120). Pleasure theories suffer from confusing an effect, the pleasure of satisfaction, with the ground or cause of action.

Nishida's own theory of ethics as grounded on the activity of will is the conception, he feels, which most properly characterizes or "approaches" the nature of human experience. This is because pure experience or reality itself is most directly reflected in the activity and striving of the self. The realization in action of our "most profound internal demands" is the "development and perfection of the self," or the good. The state of perfection or the ultimate good is interpreted by Nishida to be a condition

of selflessness, in which the individual acts in spontaneous, unconscious harmony with reality. Moral expression of the personality is, in Nishida's account, closely analogous to the expression of the accomplished artist.

In this context, Nishida characterizes perfect moral expression as "sincere" and "natural." Sincerity arises from the perfect expression of our "deepest demands." Nishida remarks, "Thus, for every person, the truest demands of the person always must be those which are ever fused with the ideals of the objective world seen by that person" (p. 144). The sincere person, then, would seem to be one who realizes these demands, regardless of what they might be. Nishida clearly does not mean this, but there is little argument to show what our "deepest demands" are, or what demands ought to be realized. The appeal at this point is to basic Japanese attitudes and values which are assumed rather than systematically defended. Nishida's work shows, however, that "sincerity" is much more central in the Japanese ethical mentality than it is in the Western tradition, and it carries with it strong traditional associations, much as the concept of "moral responsibility" does in the Western tradition.

Meeting "our deepest demands" is the theme of a concluding part, on religion. Nishida's appeal is to certain forms of experience which he describes in terms of the "merging" of self in the unity of being. In the preface to a new edition of his work in 1936[2] Nishida traced this conception back to youthful experiences in which the feeling of identification with and enjoyment of Nature overwhelmed him. Referring to Fechner's famous "*Die Tagesausicht gegenüben der Nachtansicht*," he found, like Fechner, that all things are true as given in our immediate experience. This doctrine forces all mediate knowledge, whether philosophical or scientific, into secondary significance, and it is in this respect that Nishida is in agreement with much that is traditional in Japanese thought.

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JOSIAH ROYCE'S SEMINAR, 1913–1914, AS RECORDED IN THE NOTEBOOKS OF HARRY T. COSTELLO. Edited by *Grover Smith,* with an essay by *Richard Hocking.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1963. Pp. vii + 209. $7.50.

Josiah Royce was fifty-eight when the seminar on which this book is based took place. Two years later he was dead. Costello, a Professor at Trinity College, Hartford, who took the notes, died four years ago.

What kind of a seminar did Royce conduct? Costello, unfortunately, showed no sense of the dramatic, so that the picture is flat. If any picture of Royce emerges, it is one consistent with Santayana's written forty years ago. Santayana claimed then that Royce "liked to see processions of facts marching on ironically [like] some great-hearted mediaeval peasant visited by mystical promptings." What is missing here is the mystical promptings, although Royce's references to medieval thought indicate

[2]The present publication does not include a translation of this interesting preface. Professor Noda kindly called its existence to my attention and translated it for me.

his concern for Christian scholasticism. But Royce emerges as more of a robot at Costello's hand than he surely deserves.

Besides Royce's loyalty to medieval studies, what is most striking in the notebooks of Costello is his loyalty to Charles S. Peirce, and his willingness to let his students talk without interjecting himself at every lull in the seminar. Nevertheless, we are disappointed to find that Royce as a man with insight, wit, and inimitable mannerism does not emerge, perhaps a commentary on a graduate student's inability to understand or assess professors. (Costello was twenty-eight at the time of the seminar.) How can we escape the judgment that for those who heard Royce this account will have a nostalgic charm; but for those who did not it is tedious.

Little enough of the book has vitality. One of the few highpoints is Costello's praise of Royce's method, in Appendix A:

> Most of us today, as philosophers, hedge and equivocate lest we be caught off base. We don't want to expose our half-formed thoughts to possible refutation. We are too self-consciously proud to love the truth. . . . [Costello asked W. P. Montague] Why don't you run a seminar? You are full of ideas. "I prefer to make my mistakes in private. I can't think under public scrutiny." Yet Montague's greatest weakness was lack of self-criticism. He needed to come bang up against criticism. It would have stimulated him to novelties he never realized. Plato said you cannot really learn philosophy out of books; they do not explain or answer back. They need the personal touch, and that was what Royce gave us (pp. 194–195).

Professor Richard Hocking, in an illuminating introductory essay, claims that Royce has been neglected until quite recently. He quotes Gabriel Marcel, who said that Royce "marks a transition between absolute idealism and existentialist thought" (p. 21). But, of course, this refers to Roman Catholic or Protestant existentialism and not to that of the more viable Sartre and Camus. Another cause of a new interest in Royce, according to Hocking, is his insight that the mystic and the realist are "dialectical companions, each requiring the other." That Royce and Richard Hocking believe this is no guarantee of its truth. Yet, it is worth considering if for no other purpose than to try to imagine just what Royce or Hocking intend by "realist." It must be scholastic realism and not something in the twentieth century.

Whether Royce can be resurrected from his well-deserved rest remains to be seen. Surely much of the activity to raise interest in his resuscitation stems from desperate men trying to revive the teleological view. But it will be hard going for teleological loyalty in the jungle of naturalism.

Several important lessons may be learned from the seminar. First, do not allow anyone to take notes, but, if they should, let them be complete. Second, there must be direction and focus in a seminar to make it meaningful rather than an emoting by the prima donna of the week. Third, it makes one reflect that the seminar is simply a more artificial extension of the lecture, where there are now six or more lecturers instead of one. What is usually missing is the passionate concern of all the seminarians because the topic is imposed, because it is part of what artificially must be done or what one ought prudently to do, and because one should have a course from a famous teacher [the most authentic reason of these].

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Books Received

Books listed are not limited to those in the field of Oriental and comparative philosophy. The style for each listing conforms to that used in the book itself. Readers who wish to review any of the books should communicate with the Editor.

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REASONING AND LOGIC. By *Richard B. Angell.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964. Pp. xiv + 625. $7.95.

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MAN SEEKS THE DIVINE (A Study in the History and Comparison of Religions). By *Edwin A. Burtt.* 2nd ed. New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. xii + 514. $5.75.

ISLAMIC SURVEYS 2 (A History of Islamic Law). By *N. J. Coulson.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964. Pp. 264. $3.95.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIVEKANANDA AND THE FUTURE OF MAN. By *G. C. Dev.* Dacca: Ramakrishna Mission, 1963. Pp. 106. Rs. 2.00, 3 shillings.

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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERNAL TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS. By *Edmund Husserl.* Edited by *Martin Heidegger.* Translated by *James S. Churchill.* Introduction by *Calvin O. Schrag.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. Pp. 188. $6.50.

ART AND PHILOSOPHY (Readings in Aesthetics). By *W. E. Kennick.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. Pp. xi + 674.

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ETHICS AND THE HUMAN COMMUNITY. By *Melvin Rader.* New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Toronto, London: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964. Pp. vii + 468. $2.

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INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC. By *Nicholas Rescher.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964. Pp. xv + 360.

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Research Journal of Philosophy and Social Science

An International Bi-annual of Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology & Education, Published in October & April. Each issue contains about 200 pages on a particular subject.

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News and Notes

The purpose of this department is to keep readers informed of developments throughout the world in the field of Oriental and comparative philosophy. Appropriate news items should be sent to the Editor.

SCHOPENHAUER AND THE EAST

Among the poets and thinkers of Germany who first disclosed to the West the intellectual and spiritual world of India and rendered this fruitful for Western thought, Arthur Schopenhauer, of course, takes first place—after Herder and A. W. Schlegel. The years 1813 to 1817, in which his main work, *The World as Will and Representation,* came to completion, brought him into touch with Indian literature, for Friedrich Majer, the Orientalist, who was a pupil of Herder, revealed to Schopenhauer the teachings of the Vedānta and the mysticism of the Vedas. He became acquainted with the *Oupnekhat*, the Latin translation of a Persian version of the Upaniṣads. From his early notes, only a part of which has been published, we see how the wisdom of India was flowing into his own sphere of ideas. As early as 1816, he was able to say that his doctrine could hardly have come about before the Upaniṣads, Plato, and Kant had simultaneously influenced him.

Moreover, India continued to be for him a definitive experience. At the time of his death in 1860 at Frankfurt am Main—Frankfurt was the city in which he spent the last three decades of his life—his library had increased to some three thousand volumes, and among these were to be found all the essential works which English, French, and German scholars during his lifetime had published on Buddhism and on the philosophies and religions of India and of Asia in the wider sense. Thus there were available to him texts and translations and the standard works of secondary literature.

Today, Schopenhauer's library is scattered to the four winds, but the attempt at a reconstruction can yet be made with a good prospect of success. Such an attempt, which could render feasible a fresh insight into the development of Schopenhauer's philosophy, into its significance in the history of the human mind, and into its continued effectiveness, is one of the tasks of the Schopenhauer Archives at Frankfurt am Main. Started half a century ago as an institution of the Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft and incorporated after World War I with the Schopenhauer collection of the Frankfurt City Library into one complete collection, the Archives are to be enlarged into a central research headquarters of international standing. Dr. Arthur Hübscher, President of the international Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft, was summoned to Frankfurt to take charge of this research center. The tasks and investigations will in no way be confined to Schopenhauer and his work, but, with the intellectual assumptions and results of that work, will embrace the entire range of philosophical problems, and will link Schopenhauer's ideas with the present day. The meeting of East and West, so significantly inaugurated by Schopenhauer, will in this connection play an essential role in the work and program of the Archives.

Inquiries may be addressed to Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft e. V., Sitz: Frankfurt am Main. Der Vorsitzende: Dr. Arthur Hübscher. 6000 Frankfurt am Main-Niederursel, Robkopfstrabe 10, Haus Zoll (bisherige Bezeichnung: Heddernheimer Landstrabe 225).

Johnson Reprint Corporation, 111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10003, and Johnson Reprint Company, Ltd., Berkeley Square House, London W.1, England, announce the publication of back issues of *Philosophy East and West.* This publication is of special interest to those whose requests for past volumes and issues could not be met. It is hoped that this reprint edition will encourage individuals and institutions in both East and West to take advantage of the renewed availability of this Journal.

Announcement has been made of the establishment of *Foundations of Language: International Journal of Language and Philosophy.* It is described as ". . . an international journal on the foundations of language [and as] various types of language should be represented . . . For the same reasons Oriental and in particular Indian contributions, reflecting as they do a long tradition of linguistic thought, will be welcomed."

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Volume I, No. 1, of *American Philosophical Quarterly* was issued January, 1964. This new journal is published under the editorship of Professor Nicholas Rescher, with the advice and assistance of a distinguished board of editorial consultants.

The Journal's official policy is as follows:

"The scope of the *American Philosophical Quarterly* is to be the entire range of philosophical inquiry: it will be emphatically synoptic—no branch of philosophy and no approach to the subject will be excluded from the intended purview. The editorial policy is to publish work of high quality regardless of the school of thought from which it derives.

"A continuing feature . . . will be the publication of analytical and evaluative surveys of 'Recent Work in . . .' various areas of philosophy, taking account not only of books, but of significant discussions in the journal literature. It is hoped that this series will help to keep readers abreast of developments in all regions of philosophy in this day of intensive and far-flung cultivation of our subject."

The XIth International Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions was held at Claremont, California, September 7–12, 1965. The officers are: President: Dr. G. Widengren, Secretary General: Dr. C. J. Bleeker. Officers of Local Organizing Committee: Ernest C. Colwell, Chairman; Herbert W. Schneider, Secretary, 143 East 10 Street, Claremont, California.

The American Program Committee is headed by Professor Kenneth W. Morgan of Colgate University.

This international organization of scholars is holding its periodic Congress for the first time in the Western Hemisphere and is making a special effort to expand its representation in the Orient and Latin America. It is hoped that this information will reach (in addition to members) persons who are professionally engaged in teaching or research in the history and theory of religion and who do not have access to an organization affiliated with the IAHR.

The program of the Congress consists of three parts:

I. Plenary Sessions on "Traditional Religions under the Impact of Cultural Modernization."
II. Sectional Meetings on "Guilt and Rites of Purification."
III. A Symposium on "Relations Among Religions Today."

The Grinnell Seminar on Order, 1963–64, supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, has completed its lecture stage and is preparing the papers for publication. Dr. Paul G. Kuntz, Noble Professor of Philosophy, is Director of the Seminar on Order.

During the 1963–64 academic year a large number of Lecturers appeared personally and others allowed papers to be included among the proceedings. Among these papers were the following that may well be of special interest to readers of this Journal:

Edward Conze, Oxford and Wisconsin, "Dharma as a Spiritual, Cosmic and Social Force"
Charles Hartshorne, Texas, "Order and Chaos"
Joseph M. Kitagawa, Chicago, "Chaos, Order and Freedom in World Religions"
W. Donald Oliver, Missouri, "Order and Personality"
Samuel E. Stumpf, Vanderbilt, "The Moral Order and the Legal Order"
Paul Weiss, Yale and Southern California, "Reality and Order"

Despite previously published Notes concerning Stanford University's programs of special work in Far Eastern languages in Tokyo and Taipei, it is worth noting that the Center in Tokyo is not limited to languages but is an "Inter-University Center for Japanese Studies in Tokyo," which also includes work in the thought and culture of Japan.

The Seminar and World Conference of the Sri Aurobindo Society was held from August 10th to 14th, 1964, at the Theatre of Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education, Pondicherry. The primary subjects for the Seminar were: How can humanity become one? What is the way of making the consciousness of human unity grow in men? What is a change of consciousness? How can a change of consciousness change the life upon earth?

Although—unfortunately—the program of the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, announced recently by the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, includes no specific courses in Asian philosophies, and lists among the faculty members of the Center no philosophically trained personnel and no department of philosophy, the following courses are of interest to readers of this Journal.

Great Civilizations of Asia
Modern Asia and the West
History of Far Eastern Thought (Inc. Buddhist India)
Buddhism
Art of India
The Indian Temple
Medieval Indian Art
Sociological Principles and Problems

The Cultural Integration Fellowship was founded in San Francisco in 1951 by Dr. Haridas Chaudhuri, Professor of Philosophy and Religion and Chairman of the Department of South Asia at the American Academy of Asian Studies. It has its permanent headquarters, including office, library and research center, at 3494 21st Street.

CIF "draws inspiration from the teaching of Sri Aurobindo. His Integral Yoga represents the crowning fulfillment—the harmonious and dynamic synthesis—of the ancient yoga systems of India on the one hand and the traditions of Jewish, Taoist, Christian, and Sufi mysticism on the other. His Integral Philosophy reconciles the highest cultural values of East and West, harmonizing mystical transcendentalism with evolutionary progressivism."

Inquiries may be addressed to Dr. Chaudhuri at the above address.

In the Programs in Asian Studies of the Committee on Asian Studies at the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and the Graduate School of Southern Illinois University are the following courses:

Introduction to the Oriental Humanities (India, China, Japan)
Philosophies and Religions of India
Philosophies and Religions of China and Japan
Peoples and Cultures of Asia
Oriental Art
Introduction to Far Eastern Civilization
Special Problems in Philosophy: Oriental Philosophy

Professor William Henry Harris, member of the 1959 East-West Philosophers' Conference, is Chairman of the Asian Studies Committee.

The program of The Thirteenth Annual Meeting Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs, held in October, 1964, at Southern Illinois University, included a section entitled "Fate and Freedom in Recent South Asian Thought," chaired by Professor William Henry Harris, of Southern Illinois University. This section included "Resistance to Resignation in Recent Hindu Thought," by Karl Potter, University of

Minnesota, and "Samsara Reconsidered," by Winston L. King, Vanderbilt University. Discussants were:

Fred L. Parrish
Kansas State University
Friedrich Bischoff
Indiana University

The Ph.D. program in Buddhist Studies at the University of Wisconsin has now completed its third year of operation.

All students are required to take the introductory courses on Indian Buddhism and Far Eastern Buddhism before proceeding to advanced courses on doctrine. History courses and Buddhist Social Institutions are open to students without previous courses in Buddhism. Students entering the program without preparation in Sanskrit and Chinese have to take elementary courses in these languages before they are admitted to Buddhist Sanskrit, Buddhist Chinese, and Pali. Seminars generally have language prerequisites. For these reasons, four years of course work is necessary for most students in this program, though the policy is to dissuade students from taking longer than four years, unless they are also taking a virtual Ph.D. in Indian Language and Literature.

The instructional staff consists of Richard H. Robinson, Alex Wayman, Minoru Kiyota, and Robert J. Miller.

THE VISVABHARATI QUARTERLY

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I consider the Visvabharati Quarterly a journal of literary and artistic merit and look forward to getting it. It is right that in the midst of our day-to-day politics we should have journals which deal with other problems in a scholarly manner. Otherwise we are apt to get lopsided. I hope that this Quarterly will flourish and will receive the encouragement and support that is its due.—JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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